SOME PUNISHING EFFECTS OF RESPONSE‐FORCE<sup>1</sup>

Miller, L. Keith

doi:10.1901/jeab.1970.13-215

Cited by 15 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…For example, when an avoidance contingency involving the prevention of monetary loss was removed, students' instructed avoidance performances were unaffected over several sessions (Galizio, 1979). Conversely, instructed responding that is incompatible with the function of a collateral contingency is more liable to be modified by it (Miller, 1970;Scobie & Kaufman, 1969). For example, in students' instructed avoidance, control by inaccurate instructions for a lowrate avoidance performance was overridden by a high-rate avoidance contingency (Galizio, 1979).…”

Section: Collateral Contingencies Performance Descriptions and Contimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The form of instructed responding is then largely controlled by the contingency on compliance. For example, for a productionline worker who is instructed to perform an assembly, the collateral consequences are the assembled items that are neither reinforcers nor punishers; much like a bar press, it is their production that is reinforced (Miller, 1970). As defined by the pay schedule, however, the items enter into a discriminative relation with reinforcement.…”

Section: Collateral Contingencies Performance Descriptions and Contimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Discrimination Theory of Rule‐governed Behavior

Cerutti

1989

J Exper Analysis Behavior

158

114

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In rule-governed behavior, previously established elementary discriminations are combined in complex instructions and thus result in complex behavior. Discriminative combining and recombining of responses produce behavior with characteristics differing from those of behavior that is established through the effects of its direct consequences. For example, responding in instructed discrimination may be occasioned by discriminative stimuli that are temporally and situationally removed from the circumstances under which the discrimination is instructed. The present account illustrates properties of rule-governed behavior with examples from research in instructional control and imitation learning. Units of instructed behavior, circumstances controlling compliance with instructions, and rule-governed problem solving are considered.

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Section: Collateral Contingencies Performance Descriptions and Contimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Collateral Contingencies Performance Descriptions and Contimentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrimination Theory of Rule‐governed Behavior

Cerutti

1989

J Exper Analysis Behavior

158

114

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“…Less surprising is that very few of these have investigated control by noxious events such as loud noise (e.g., Azrin, 1958) or electric shock (e.g., Ader & Tatum, 1961 Weiner, 1962). Other aversive events have included termination of room illumination (Shipley, Baron, & Kaufman, 1972), timeout from viewing a cartoon movie (Baer, 1960), and increased work (Miller, 1970). All of the usual schedules of aversive control have been investigated, at least in a preliminary way, including escape (e.g., Azrin, 1958), avoidance (e.g., Stone, 1961), punishment (e.g., Zimmerman & Baydan, 1963), and the conditioned emotional response paradigm (e.g., Remington & Strongman, 1970).…”

Section: Ethical Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Place of the Human Subject in the Operant Laboratory

Baron

Perone

1982

BEHAV ANALYST

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Although laboratory study of human behavior seems an obvious vehicle for strengthening the scientific base of behavior analysis, the place of the human subject within the operant laboratory remains problematic. The prevailing research strategy has been to link principles developed with animals to human affairs, either through interpretation of naturally occurring human behaviors or through application of the principles to the solution of human problems. The paucity of laboratory research on human operant behavior derives from several misconceptions: the possibility that experimental demand characteristics and pre-experimental behavioral dispositions of human subjects contaminate the results; that ethical considerations place undue constraint on research topics and experimental designs; and that uncontrollable variation in subjects' histories and other relevant personal characteristics prevents observation of reliable functional relations. We argue that these problems do not pose insurmountable obstacles to the experimental analysis of human behavior; that adequate methods of control and analysis are available; and that operant techniques, by emphasizing experimentally imposed contingencies, are well suited for the laboratory study of human behavior.Behavior analysis originated in the laboratory and discussions of the research methods developed there naturally emphasized experimental work with animals, usually rats and pigeons (Ferster, 1953;Sidman, 1960;Skinner, 1938). Descriptions of specific apparatuses were accompanied by explanations and justifications of the rationale of the characteristic methods, including free-operant procedures rather than instrumental ones, close experimental control rather than statistical analysis, and extended observations of individual subjects rather than brief study of large numbers of subjects.Subsequently, attention turned toward extending these methods to the analysis of human behavior, in particular the socially important behaviors involved in retardation, crime, mental illness, and education (Baer, Wolfe, & Risley, 1968;Hersen & Barlow, 1976;Sidman, 1962

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“…Baum's (1973) refinement of the law of effect provides a context for extending the operationalization of cost beyond the numeric parameters of schedules of reinforcement to parameters of response effort. When response effort was manipulated by varying the force required to press a lever to produce reinforcement, rate of responding decreased with increasing responseforce requirements in both nonhumans (Brener & Mitchell, 1989;Chung, 1965;Crossman & Serna, 1982;Ginter & Armus, 1989;Keehn, 1981;Mintz, Samuels, & Barber, 1976) and humans (McDowell & Wood, 1985;Miller, 1970). Thus, demand functions may be conceptualized not only as changes in schedule requirements for a constant quantity of reinforcement but also as changes in response effort required for qualitative or quantitative consequences (Tustin, 1994).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Costs of Eating: A Behavioral Economic Analysis of Food Refusal

Kerwin¹,

Ahearn²,

Eicher³

et al. 1995

J of App Behav Analysis

126

106

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Behavioral economic concepts were applied to the analysis and treatment of pediatric feeding disorders in a clinical setting. In Experiment 1, children who chronically refused food were presented with varying amounts of food on a spoon (empty, dipped, quarter, half, and level). Each child exhibited a different but orderly demand function of response (acceptance, expulsion, and mouth clean) by cost (increasing spoon volume) for a constant pay-off of toys and social interaction. In Experiment 2, physical guidance or nonremoval of the spoon for food refusal was initiated at the smallest spoon volume with low levels of acceptance, and was subsequently introduced at the largest spoon volume with moderate levels of acceptance. Treatment was effective in increasing acceptance, and these effects generalized hierarchically across untargeted spoon volumes. The results of both studies provide preliminary support that increasing spoon volume can be equated conceptually with increasing response effort, and that the change from differential reinforcement to physical guidance or nonremoval of the spoon appears to have altered the elasticity of each child's demand function.

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SOME PUNISHING EFFECTS OF RESPONSE‐FORCE¹

Cited by 15 publications

References 16 publications

Discrimination Theory of Rule‐governed Behavior

Discrimination Theory of Rule‐governed Behavior

The Place of the Human Subject in the Operant Laboratory

The Costs of Eating: A Behavioral Economic Analysis of Food Refusal

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SOME PUNISHING EFFECTS OF RESPONSE‐FORCE1

Cited by 15 publications

References 16 publications

Discrimination Theory of Rule‐governed Behavior

Discrimination Theory of Rule‐governed Behavior

The Place of the Human Subject in the Operant Laboratory

The Costs of Eating: A Behavioral Economic Analysis of Food Refusal

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SOME PUNISHING EFFECTS OF RESPONSE‐FORCE¹