Some properties of transportation network cooperative games

Gnecco, Giorgio; Hadas, Yuval; Sanguineti, Marcello

doi:10.1002/net.21887

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Then, the vector of the Shapley values of the players, represented therein by the network nodes, was used to evaluate the node centrality. Theoretical properties of the resulting centrality measure were investigated in [20,22]. Unfortunately, the utility functions defined in [22] are not suitable to model congestion, as they refer to situations in which the cost associated with each arc is given exogenously.…”

Section: Transportation Network Cooperative Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

et al. 2021

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Braess' paradox is a classical result in the theory of congestion games. It motivates theoretically why adding a resource (e.g., an arc) to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Differently from previous literature, which studies Braess' paradox in a non‐cooperative game‐theoretic setting, in this work, a framework is proposed to investigate its occurrence by exploiting cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) on networks. In this way, instead of focusing on the marginal contribution to the network utility provided by the insertion of an arc when a single initial scenario is considered, the arc average marginal utility with respect to various initial scenarios, that is, its Shapley value in a suitably‐defined TU game, is evaluated. It is shown that, for choices of the utility function of the TU game modeling congestion, there are cases for which the Shapley value associated with an arc is negative, meaning that its average marginal contribution to the network utility is negative.

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Section: Transportation Network Cooperative Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

et al. 2021

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“…Indeed, vertex relevance measures from cooperative games were applied in several contexts in which the players were not necessarily modeled as rational/intelligent entities. For instance, the Shapley value was applied to investigate vertex relevance in gene regulatory networks [20] and transportation networks [10], [11], [12]. It was also proposed as a way to provide feature selection in machine-learning problems in which the players are features and the characteristic function measures the predictive power of each subset of features [21].…”

Section: Extensions Of the Theoretical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Games restricted to graphs, first investigated in [8], are able to represent naturally occurring situations in which any two players from among a coalition of players can coordinate with each other only if they are joined by a path (i.e., by a channel of communication). Examples of studies in which graph-theoretical and game-theoretical tools are combined can be found in several recent works [9]- [11], with the aim to investigate vertex relevance in graphs. In our approach, we model the human body as a graph and apply game theory to measure in real time the most relevant joint of the body from which movement originates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automated Analysis of the Origin of Movement: An Approach Based on Cooperative Games on Graphs

Kolykhalova

Gnecco

Sanguineti

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Human-Mach. Syst.

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In this work, a computational method is proposed to automatically investigate the perception of the origin of full-body human movement and its propagation. The method is based on a mathematical game built over a suitably defined graph structure representing the human body. The players of this game are the graph vertices, which form a subset of body joints. Since each vertex contributes to a shared goal (i.e., to the way in which a specific movement-related feature is transferred among the joints), a cooperative game-theoretical model (specifically a transferableutility game) is adopted, which is able (via the Shapley value) to measure the relevance of the various joints in human movement when performing full-body movement analysis. The method is theoretically investigated and applied to a motion capture dataset obtained from subjects who performed expressive movements. Finally, the method is validated through an online survey, in which several dancers/nondancers participated. The results show the capability of the proposed approach to represent the evolution of the most important joint responsible for originating each dancer's movement. Index Terms-Automated analysis of the perception of the origin of movement, cooperative game theory, full-body movement analysis, graph theory, transferable-utility (TU) games. PDGP 2018/20 DIT.AD016.001 (Technologies for Smart Communities). This article was recommended by Associate Editor X. Hu.

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“…This work, which is in the same research direction as [16], studies Braess' paradox in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility on a graph [20], which can model, for example, transportation networks [6,8]. The players can be either nodes or arcs of the graph (in this paper, they are arcs).…”

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confidence: 99%

On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games

Passacantando

Gnecco

Hadas

et al. 2021

AIRO Springer Series

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In the theory of congestion games, the Braess' paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative gametheoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.

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Some properties of transportation network cooperative games

Cited by 7 publications

References 16 publications

Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

Braess' paradox: A cooperative game‐theoretic point of view

Automated Analysis of the Origin of Movement: An Approach Based on Cooperative Games on Graphs

On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games

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