Some Perspectives on South African Foreign Policy Making

Geldenhuys, Deon

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-17501-7_8

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Another significant aspect of this relationship was seen in the 1970s when Israel experienced an isolation period more like that of South Africa simply because African states condemned the Arab‐Israeli war in 1973. Just as this period saw oil embargoes being imposed on South Africa, other measures included 1968's United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issue of Jerusalem and Israel's intention to transform the lawful status of the city and in 1976, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa deemed Israel guilty of war crimes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) (Geldenhuys, 1984: 74).…”

Section: Historical Account In Foreign Policy Changes: South Africa–i...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency and inconsistency in the foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa towards Israel

Rapanyane

2021

Journal of Public Affairs

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The subject of South Africa‐Israel relations has always been a considerable scholarly topic that is amongst the ongoing academic and policy makers' debates. This is because of the uncertainties and confusion that exists in South Africa's foreign policy stance on Israel in the contemporary period. In this secondary data‐based research article, the author analyses the historical relations between South Africa and Israel with Palestine in question. The central aim is to analyse the consistencies and inconsistencies historically and contemporarily shown by South Africa's foreign policy towards Israel. The article looked at the pre‐and post‐apartheid governments' foreign policy positions. The author argued that there is no gainsaying that South Africa had good relations with Israel during apartheid. These relations only became unstable when South Africa adopted democracy, but scholars still observe a lot of uncertainties on South Africa's Israeli foreign policy stance, particularly in the context of Palestine in question. This is especially in economic and political links which still exist between the two countries. Afrocentricity as a theoretical lens has been adopted. The results show that whilst the pre‐democratic apartheid government enjoyed good relations with Israel; the new democratic government has continuously had unstable relations with Israel. The article concluded that whilst the African National Congress (ANC) government is policy conflicted on relations with Israel; it though enjoys economic engagement with their so‐called internationally condemned apartheid Israel. The initial recommendation made was that the new democratic ANC government should make a firm policy stance on Israel to clear any policy confusion.

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Section: Historical Account In Foreign Policy Changes: South Africa–i...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Consistency and inconsistency in the foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa towards Israel

Rapanyane

2021

Journal of Public Affairs

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“…During the apartheid period, the international community regarded South Africa as a pariah, and its foreign policy was termed the 'diplomacy of isolation' (Geldenhuys 1984). From its inception as an independent entity in 1910 to the end of minority rule in 1994, South African governments assumed an interventionist attitude towards the 'African hinterland'.…”

Section: The South African Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case

Flemes

2007

SSRN Journal

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Regional powers can be distinguished by four pivotal criteria: claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments, and acceptance of leadership. Ap plying these indicators to the South African case, the analysis demonstrates the crucial significance of institutional foreign policy instruments. But although the South African government is ready to pay the costs of co operative hegemony (such as capacity building for regional institutions and peacekeeping), the regional acceptance of South Africa's lead ership is constrained by its historical legacy. Additionally, Pretoria's foreign policy is based on ideational resources such as its reputation as an advocate of democracy and hu man rights and the legitimacy derived from its paradigmatic behaviour as a 'good global citizen'. However, the Mbeki presidency is more successful in converting these resources into discursive instruments of interest assertion in global, rather than in regional bargains.In effect the regional power's reformist South oriented multilateralism is challenging some of the guiding principles of the current international system. Key words: South Africa, regional power, foreign policy, co operative hegemony, multi polarisation of the international system

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“…The military's hard-line approach was adopted, and the invasion of Angola soon mounted (Geldenhuys, 1984: 79, 295 and passim). Many in the Department of Foreign Affairs had believed that the wisest course was to adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations (a principle which South Africa constantly invokes on its own behalf), that Angola should be treated with the same restraint as Mozambique, and that the gains from invasion were not worth the likely international repercussions.…”

Section: B South Africa's Implementation Of "Total Strategy"mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The State Security Council (SSC), which advises the government on "national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic" (Geldenhuys, 1984: The SSC presides over a pervasive apparatus known as the "national security management system.' Regularized decision-making on regional security was mandatory for total strategy to work.…”

Section: Journal Of Interamerican Studies and World Affairsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cuba's Impact in Southern Africa

Kahn

1987

J. inter-Am. stud. world aff.

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. THIS ARTICLE ASSESSES the impact of the Cuban military on strategic, diplomatic and political relationships in southern Africa. It does not deal with why Cuba and its Soviet benefactor have interested themselves in the region, nor does it discuss Soviet influence on Cuban foreign policy.1 The aspects covered here include: (1) how Cuba and Angola fit into the complex pattern of regional relations in southern Africa; (2) an outline of the region's main territorial actors and guerrilla movements, along with a brief history of Cuban involvement in the area; (3) the response of South Africa to this foreign spoiler of its regional hegemony; (4) regional cooperation in southern Africa insofar as it is a response to South Africa's militancy in the face of international communism as represented in the region by Cuba; and (5) Cuba's effect upon the economy and polity of Angola and Mozambique. I. BACKGROUND NEARLY 500 YEARS elapsed between the founding of Portugal's first trading post in southern Africa and the granting of independence toPortugal's colonies. At the end of that period Portugal suffered a military coup which gave rise to a domestic turmoil that made its new government even more hasty to jettison colonies than had been the case with the other European colonizers. In Angola, Portugal was determined to transfer power to whatever contending anti-colonial movement controlled the capital that day (11 November 1975).One of the Angolan independence movements, the Movimento Popular de Libertagao deAngola (MPLA), was able to call on Cuba to help it win the day. The Soviets had begun backing the MPLA in the early-1960s, in keeping with Khruschev's policy of support for national liberation movements. Part of that assistance consisted of military training provided by Cuban advisors.2 Since then, Cuba has continuously supported the MPLA. The Soviets, by contrast, twice let their (Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola); and the second time in 1973-74, due to differences with the MPLA leadership. In early 1975, the Soviets began airlifting arms to the MPLA, while Cuba sent military advisors. By midyear the MPLA controlled the capital and much of the country. However, when aid from the United States, South Africa and China to a coalition of rival groups began to turn the tide, the MPLA requested further assistance from Cuba, and the Soviet Union airlifted Cuban troops into Angola. With their help, the MPLA prevented the rival coalition from taking Luanda, the capital city The US has supported one of the MPLA's...

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Some Perspectives on South African Foreign Policy Making

Cited by 17 publications

References 2 publications

Consistency and inconsistency in the foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa towards Israel

Consistency and inconsistency in the foreign policy of the Republic of South Africa towards Israel

Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case

Cuba's Impact in Southern Africa

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