Some Normative Implications of Korsgaard's Theory of the Intersubjectivity of Reason

Abstract

This article argues that Christine Korsgaard's conception of self-constitution can be historicized by considering the impact of actual humans on our reflective activity. Because Korsgaard bases her argument on a philosophy of action rather than of intention (as Kant does), and our actions must always be concrete, the article argues that the principles for action which we develop in reflection are likewise responses to concrete human demands. It further interprets the types of demands humans make on each other as the expression of historical circumstance rather than as transcendentally anchored. The notion of universal respect that reflection seeks to achieve is thus seen as developing by a self-correcting process of concrete human interaction. Finally, the article concludes that there can be no metaphysical proof of morality, since morality develops through human interaction that seeks to approximate the idea of respect for persons.

Practical Identity, Obligation, and Sociality

“…The problem arises because, if it is only upon reflection that we find that the other is a relevant part of us, such that hurting the other is akin to hurting one’s self, it is not entirely clear how to separate obligations toward the other as such and those toward one’s self. William FitzPatrick (, 42) has suggested that Korsgaard is unable to avoid this sort of “psychologization” of moral experience, and Stefan Bird‐Pollan more explicitly pointed in this direction when he asked, “Is interaction really only with one’s own principle or is it with the other, actual, people who have their own principles?” (, 377)…”