Some fundamentals of B. F. Skinner's behaviorism.

Abstract

We undertake to predict and control the behavior of the individual organism. (Skinner, 1953, p. 35) The object [of my research] has been to discover the functional relations which prevail between measurable aspects of behavior and various conditions and events in the life of the organism. The success of such a venture is gauged by the extent to which behavior can, as a result of the relationships discovered, actually be predicted and controlled. (Skinner, 1972, pp. 257-258) If we have achieved a true scientific understanding of man, we should be able to prove this in the actual prediction and control of his behavior. (Skinner, 1972, p. 259) The laboratory techniques . . . and their technological applications, emphasize the prediction and control of behavior via the manipulation of variables. Validation is found primarily in We gratefully acknowledge H. S. Pennypacker and E. F. Malagodi for their consummate assistance with the development of this article, W. A. Balliet for his contributions to an earlier version of this article and W. S. Verplanck and I. S. Schwartz for their comments on an earlier version.

Why Behave? The Problem of Initiating Causes and the Goals of Prediction and Control

“…Indeed, the ontological status of private events is assumed to be identical to that of any other aspect of the physical world (Delprato & Midgley, 1992). Behavior analysts still speak of two types of causes, those that are initiating, and those that are not.…”

“…In science, behavior analysts maintain that the criterion for successful operation is whether one is getting closer to the goals of prediction and control, which they see as the primary goals of science (see e.g., Delprato & Midgley, 1992;Hayes & Brownstein, 1986). Based on these premises, it seems strange that most behavior analysts are unwilling to entertain the hypothesis that private events can be as full and complete causes of behavior as events that are easier to observe and manipulate.…”

“…In spite of this, and though the rationale for doing so may be neither crystal-clear nor consistently applied, private events have been singled out by behavior analysts as being second-rate stimuli, in the sense that they cannot be full and real causes of behavior. This appears problematic, because an explanation seems to be lacking as to why internal stimuli , whose status is said to be "identical to that of any other aspect of the physical world" (Delprato & Midgley, 1992, p. 1512, are still assumed to lack the capacity to cause behavior in the same full sense as stimuli that can be more easily observed.…”

“…Catania (1998) and Parrott (1983), among others, support this view. Indeed, in the words of Delprato andMidgley (1992, p. 1512): "Private events refer to 'real' events, and their ontological status is identical to that of any other aspect of the physical world. "…”

“…On the one hand, behavior analysts emphasize that there is no physical difference between stimuli in an organism's internal milieu and those appearing in the external environment (e.g., Delprato & Midgley, 1992;Skinner, 1963). In spite of this, and though the rationale for doing so may be neither crystal-clear nor consistently applied, private events have been singled out by behavior analysts as being second-rate stimuli, in the sense that they cannot be full and real causes of behavior.…”