Some Doubts about Folk Jurisprudence: The Case of Proximate Cause

Jiménez, F. Mazzucchelli

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3815405

Cited by 3 publications

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“…After all, those who take this view would object that the data described so far are simply irrelevant. 63 Even if we don't accept that objection, it would still be normatively important to identify instances where laypeople and lawyers disagree systematically in their judgments. After all, we have seen that legal scholars often value publicity.…”

Section: (Iii) Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Purposes in Law and in Life: An Experimental Investigation of Purpose Attribution

Almeida

Knobe²,

Struchiner³

et al. 2022

Can. J. Law Jurisprud.

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There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation.

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Section: (Iii) Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Purposes in Law and in Life: An Experimental Investigation of Purpose Attribution

Almeida

Knobe²,

Struchiner³

et al. 2022

Can. J. Law Jurisprud.

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“…Jiménez (2023, this volume; see also Jiménez, 2021) has recently raised doubts about experimental jurisprudence. With special jurisprudential concepts such as intention, cause, consent and the like, Jiménez observes, there "might be three notions [...] at play: that of the theorist, that of the lawyer, and that of the ordinary person" (2023, 5).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Meaning of ‘Reasonable’: Evidence From a Corpus-Linguistic Study

Baumgartner,

Kneer

2023

SSRN Journal

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“…E.g.,Brannon (2015);Kavanaugh (2016);Solan and Gales (2016). 2 For further reflections on the relation between ordinary and legal language, see, for example,Jiménez (2021);Knobe and Shapiro (2021);Prochownik (2022);Tobia (2020Tobia ( , 2022. 3 See, for example,Westen (2008);Moran (2010);Gardner (2015);Zipursky (2015);Mangini (2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

Causation and the Silly Norm Effect

Güver¹,

Kneer²

2023

Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law

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Whereas in certain domains, the law relies on terms of art (e.g., "injunction, " "double jeopardy, " "punitive damages, " and "bankruptcy"), in others-in particular in criminal law-it invokes, or takes itself to invoke, the plain everyday meaning of the expressions used. is is unsurprising: citizens, standardly not equipped with a law degree, must understand what the law says in order to adhere to it. Furthermore, in common law jurisdictions, nonexperts help decide court cases in jury trials. And when it comes to disputes in statutory interpretation among judges, turning to ordinary meaning is one, if not-as some scholars and practitioners argue 1 -the evident strategy to resolve them. 2 According to what we term the correspondence assumption, certain central legal expressions are taken to refer to the same concepts as their corresponding ordinary language analogues (at least within designated spheres of the law). Candidate concepts for the correspondence assumption are plentiful. Consent is one. At a recent sexual misconduct trial in the United States, the judge refused to provide conceptual classification and stated that "the jury will decide what consent means to them" (Puente, Sloan, & Deerwester, 2018; for empirical work on the notion of consent, see Sommers, 2020). e expression "reasonable" and the concept it denotes constitute another example. As Gardner (2015) writes, the reasonable person standard "exists to allow the law to pass the buck, to help itself pro tempore to standards of justification that are not themselves set by the law" (p. 36). Naturally, for a maneuver of this sort to even begin to make sense, it must be assumed that the lay person's concept of reasonableness fits the law's demands. 3 In many jurisdictions, the central mens rea concepts, such as intention, are subject to the correspondence assumption-which is perhaps one of the key reasons why, very frequently, they are le partially or entirely uncodified. 4 e English courts have made this explicit stating that "the legal meaning of the word 'intention' is the ordinary meaning of the word" (Herring, 2012, p. 135). In R v. Moloney [1985], Lord Bridge put it as follows:

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Some Doubts about Folk Jurisprudence: The Case of Proximate Cause

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Purposes in Law and in Life: An Experimental Investigation of Purpose Attribution

Purposes in Law and in Life: An Experimental Investigation of Purpose Attribution

The Meaning of ‘Reasonable’: Evidence From a Corpus-Linguistic Study

Causation and the Silly Norm Effect

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