In the cortical motor system, matching between motor representations and sensory inputs allows the emergence of different types of cognitive abilities. One of these matching mechanisms is represented by monkey mirror neurons that activate both when a monkey executes a goal-related motor act and when it observes a similar motor act performed by another individual. The mirror neuron matching system that probably underlies action understanding has been demonstrated also in humans. In this article the main features of mirror neurons and the findings demonstrating their relevance for intention and emotion understanding in humans will be described and discussed. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 2
IntroductionThe notion that we possess a kind of immediate understanding of what others are doing or feeling is quite old. Adam Smith, for example, proposed the concept of sympathy, according to which we are capable of feeling something similar to what others feel by simply observing others' behaviour (Smith, 1976). Many of his descriptions of the attitude of a person observing the actions and emotions of others resemble the notion of empathy. Although nowadays this notion is often used to indicate the capacity to share others ' feelings, Lipps (1903) introduced this term (einfuhlung) in aesthetics to indicate the attitude of an observer in front of an artist's work. Note that in his original definition the observer is not looking at another individual. However, one can easily imagine that this attitude becomes even more pronounced when we are in front of other persons acting or feeling emotions. Although it is known that, at least for emotions, people "empathize" with different degrees of involvement, nobody can deny that we share this capacity with all healthy individuals of our species.A very important issue about empathy concerns the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms. One hypothesis is that higher order sensory elaboration, together with memory retrieval of known biological stimuli, can account for this type of knowledge. A further elaboration of this theory is that empathy relies on some type of inferential process, like reasoning. This type of view would assign a major role to associative cortical regions that would receive high order sensory information and transform it into perception. A possible role of internal motor representations in this process would be virtually excluded. An opposite theory postulates that understanding actions and the internal states of others can be achieved through an automatic process that matches the biological sensory input with the internal motor knowledge of the observer. According to this view internal motor representations play a crucial role, because they represent the personal knowledge through which every individual assigns meaning to the external world, in this case to the biological stimuli present in it.Page 3 of 29 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 3 The two theories about the possible neural mechanisms underlying empathy can be included in a more general t...