Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarsian Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

“…Carl B. Sachs Christias (2015) criticizes my attempt to use Merleau-Ponty to question assumptions shared by Sellars and McDowell on how perceptual experience bears on propositionally structured thought and discourse (Sachs, 2014a). Here I will first briefly recapitulate my view, then consider the two main areas of contention: whether Sellars can accept that perceptual experience is non-discursive and whether I can accept the normative significance of perception.…”