“…The results indicate that Europeans responded to the crisis by engaging themselves, although more sporadically than regularly. Reactions to COVID‐19 are similar to patterns documented by previous literature on the activation effect of crises and catastrophes: the pandemic mobilized existing solidarity practices in the form of both civic and political engagement (e.g., BMI 2020; Grasso and Giugni 2016; Grasso and Lahusen 2020; Kurer et al 2019; Penner et al 2005). Notably, large shares of the surveyed respondents indicated that they had helped in the neighbourhood (43 percent) and donated money (34 percent).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 74%
“…On the other hand, the need for solidarity with and support for those at risk has increased. As in previous crises, civil society is called to provide social assistance and mobilize on behalf of those who are otherwise invisible or out of reach for policymakers (see, e.g., BMI 2020; Grasso and Lahusen 2020; Penner et al 2005). From this perspective, civil society became crucial in maintaining social cohesion and providing channels for grassroots civic and political engagement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a first step in this research agenda, we utilize a cross‐sectional survey conducted in seven West European countries to explore (a) the (de‐)mobilizing effects during the first phase of the COVID‐19 pandemic and (b) how threat perceptions and ideological predispositions have shaped Europeans’ engagement repertoire. By doing so, we can build on a rich body of scholarly work on how Europe’s recent crises – the financial and refugee crises in particular – have affected the dynamics of engagement (e.g., Grasso and Giugni 2016; Grasso and Lahusen 2020; Kern et al 2015; Kurer et al 2019). We argue that in response to the competing threats to health and economic status, both personal and societal, citizens across the ideological spectrum needed to re‐evaluate their civic and political engagement repertoire.…”
Measures to cope with the COVID‐19 pandemic have put a sudden halt to street protests and other forms of citizen involvement in Europe. At the same time, the pandemic has increased the need for solidarity, motivating citizens to become involved on behalf of people at risk and the vulnerable more generally. This research note empirically examines the tension between the demobilisation and activation potential of the COVID‐19 crisis. Drawing on original survey data from seven Western European countries, we examine the extent, forms, and drivers of citizens’ engagement. Our findings show the remarkable persistence of pre‐existing political and civic engagement patterns. Concurrently, we show that threat perceptions triggered by the multifaceted COVID‐19 crisis have mobilized Europeans in the early phase of the pandemic. Similarly, the role of extreme ideological orientations in explaining (regular) political engagement indicates that the current situation may create its specific mobilisation potentials.
“…The results indicate that Europeans responded to the crisis by engaging themselves, although more sporadically than regularly. Reactions to COVID‐19 are similar to patterns documented by previous literature on the activation effect of crises and catastrophes: the pandemic mobilized existing solidarity practices in the form of both civic and political engagement (e.g., BMI 2020; Grasso and Giugni 2016; Grasso and Lahusen 2020; Kurer et al 2019; Penner et al 2005). Notably, large shares of the surveyed respondents indicated that they had helped in the neighbourhood (43 percent) and donated money (34 percent).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 74%
“…On the other hand, the need for solidarity with and support for those at risk has increased. As in previous crises, civil society is called to provide social assistance and mobilize on behalf of those who are otherwise invisible or out of reach for policymakers (see, e.g., BMI 2020; Grasso and Lahusen 2020; Penner et al 2005). From this perspective, civil society became crucial in maintaining social cohesion and providing channels for grassroots civic and political engagement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a first step in this research agenda, we utilize a cross‐sectional survey conducted in seven West European countries to explore (a) the (de‐)mobilizing effects during the first phase of the COVID‐19 pandemic and (b) how threat perceptions and ideological predispositions have shaped Europeans’ engagement repertoire. By doing so, we can build on a rich body of scholarly work on how Europe’s recent crises – the financial and refugee crises in particular – have affected the dynamics of engagement (e.g., Grasso and Giugni 2016; Grasso and Lahusen 2020; Kern et al 2015; Kurer et al 2019). We argue that in response to the competing threats to health and economic status, both personal and societal, citizens across the ideological spectrum needed to re‐evaluate their civic and political engagement repertoire.…”
Measures to cope with the COVID‐19 pandemic have put a sudden halt to street protests and other forms of citizen involvement in Europe. At the same time, the pandemic has increased the need for solidarity, motivating citizens to become involved on behalf of people at risk and the vulnerable more generally. This research note empirically examines the tension between the demobilisation and activation potential of the COVID‐19 crisis. Drawing on original survey data from seven Western European countries, we examine the extent, forms, and drivers of citizens’ engagement. Our findings show the remarkable persistence of pre‐existing political and civic engagement patterns. Concurrently, we show that threat perceptions triggered by the multifaceted COVID‐19 crisis have mobilized Europeans in the early phase of the pandemic. Similarly, the role of extreme ideological orientations in explaining (regular) political engagement indicates that the current situation may create its specific mobilisation potentials.
“…While the degree of support is somewhat contingent on the framing of the topic as demonstrated above, the mechanisms explaining support relay a more uniform message: cultural factors matter more for public opinion on European solidarity than structural factors. Specifically, identification with Europe and one's political left-right position seem to be prominent factors Verhaegen 2018;Grasso and Lahusen 2020;Gerhards et al 2019b), although some findings rather identify a person's social standing to be relevant for the support for the extension of solidarity (Gerhards et al 2019a;Meuleman et al 2020).…”
This paper examines similarities between attitudes towards European redistribution and attitudes towards national redistribution. It maps out possible reasons for expected similarities between the two spatial levels in the degree redistribution is supported and also the underlying mechanisms that foster support rates. To examine the underlying mechanisms, the paper employs a structural equation modelling approach. Despite vastly different institutional settings, findings indicate that the degree of support for redistribution at the national and at the European level are comparable. And we can also identify a similar structure in mechanisms fostering support rates at the European level compared to the one at the national level. Moreover, the strength of these mechanisms is also comparable at the respective spatial level. The results have important consequences for our understanding of transnational mechanisms. They suggest that social entities transcending national borders possess features comparable to national social entities (i.e., nation states). Overall, this potentially suggests that national conflict lines have the capacity to be carried over into the transnational space (e.g., the European social space).
“…The study also shows that there is considerably less support for accommodating refugees and their allocation between EU countries, especially in eastern European countries (Gerhards et al, 2019). Along similar lines, Grasso and Lahusen (2020) show that 68% of European citizens in eight EU member states somewhat or strongly support the general objective of redistributive public policies. Distinguishing between different policies, they find that 62% support redistribution for development aid, 41% for paying public debts and 35% for helping refugees (Grasso & Lahusen, 2020).…”
Section: Attitudinal European Solidaritymentioning
Drawing on the existing literature, the following chapter is dedicated to deriving a sound theoretical concept of individual European solidarity. This concept aims at capturing the solidarity of individual citizens in the EU. On one hand, this concept should model European solidarity in the European debt crisis, but on the other hand, it should also be applicable to other relevant problems that call for European solidarity. Therefore, I first review the theoretical literature on solidarity and evaluate the most important concepts in terms of their applicability to the European context. Second, I use these insights to define three key requirements for the concept of European solidarity. Third, I deduce a norm-based theoretical concept of individual European solidarity that meets the three predefined requirements. Fourth, I look at the drivers of solidarity to determine how European solidarity can be explained and ultimately strengthened.
Existing Concepts of (European) SolidarityA brief look at the historical traditions of the term solidarity helps to understand the variety of existing concepts of (European) solidarity. Starting in ancient Greece, solidarity described some sort of friendship among the population of the polis. It referred to feelings of sympathy
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