SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security

Chen, Yan; Shin, Hocheol; Bolton, Connor; Xu, Wenyuan; Kim, Yong‐Dae; Fu, Kevin

doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00026

Cited by 54 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…out-of-band signal injection attacks, where the injected signal is out of the intended range of receivers [12]. Yan et al [14] broaden the scope of out-of-band signal injection and consider the problem along the entire signal processing pipeline, which they call transduction attacks, where the victim sensor transduces physical signals to analog output with the possibility of combining effects from multiple processing stages. However, these works focus exclusively on signal injection attacks.…”

Section: A Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…From the perspective of defenses, [9] focuses on attack detection and secure estimation techniques, while [10] and [11] summarize automatic intrusion detection in CPS. More recently, [12], [13], and [14] systemize the attacks that leverage physical signals to affect the electronic components (mainly sensors) in cyber-physical systems. However, one of the unique properties of cyber-physical systems is their interaction with the physical world, and it has not been the focus of existing work to analyze the security and privacy problems stemming from such interaction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Anomaly identification [40] Sensing pipeline analysis Out-of-band injection [12], [13] Sensing pipeline analysis Transduction attack [14] Cyber-physical interaction Signal injection & Information leakage Our survey…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security and Privacy in the Emerging Cyber-Physical World: A Survey

Kaplan

Yan

et al. 2021

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

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With the emergence of low-cost smart and connected IoT devices, the area of cyber-physical security is becoming increasingly important. Past research has demonstrated new threat vectors targeting the transition process between the cyber and physical domains, where the attacker exploits the sensing system as an attack surface for signal injection or extraction of private information. Recently, there have been attempts to characterize an abstracted model for signal injection, but they primarily focus on the path of signal processing. This paper aims to systematize the existing research on security and privacy problems arising from the interaction of cyber world and physical world, with the context of broad CPS applications. The primary goals of the systematization are to (1) reveal the attack patterns and extract a general attack model of existing work, (2) understand possible new attacks, and (3) motivate development of defenses against the emerging cyber-physical threats.

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Section: A Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security and Privacy in the Emerging Cyber-Physical World: A Survey

Kaplan

Yan

et al. 2021

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

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“…Academic literature has presented signal injection attacks against a variety of sensors and devices, such as medical devices [16,21], voice-controlled personal assistants [29,46], thermometers [47], MEMS inertial sensors [33,34], air-pressure sensors [35], and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) [5,18,43,45]. Depending on the target, the attack vector can range from acoustic waves over optical emission to electromagnetic emanation [8,44]. Furthermore, signal injection attacks can be differentiated based on the component they are targeting.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Signal Injection Attacks against CCD Image Sensors

Köhler¹,

Baker²,

Martinovic³

2021

Preprint

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Since cameras have become a crucial part in many safety-critical systems and applications, such as autonomous vehicles and surveillance, a large body of academic and non-academic work has shown attacks against their main component -the image sensor. However, these attacks are limited to coarse-grained and often suspicious injections because light is used as an attack vector. Furthermore, due to the nature of optical attacks, they require the line-of-sight between the adversary and the target camera.In this paper, we present a novel post-transducer signal injection attack against CCD image sensors, as they are used in professional, scientific, and even military settings. We show how electromagnetic emanation can be used to manipulate the image information captured by a CCD image sensor with the granularity down to the brightness of individual pixels. We study the feasibility of our attack and then demonstrate its effects in the scenario of automatic barcode scanning. Our results indicate that the injected distortion can disrupt automated vision-based intelligent systems.

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“…Some of the known attacks have realistic case scenarios in which they can be executed, some have to be implemented in a controlled setup, and some are possible in theory but have not yet been implemented in a real setup. Recently, Yan et al suggested a formalization of analog sensor security and a classification of the attacks [7]. Based on this classification, in Table 1, we categorize the previously published attacks on ultrasonic sensors as denial-of-service, spoofing, acoustic cancellation, and adversarial learning attacks, and we elaborate on each of these methods below.…”

Section: Related Work On Attacks On Ultrasonic Distance Sensorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spoofing Attack on Ultrasonic Distance Sensors Using a Continuous Signal

Gluck

Kravchik

Chocron

et al. 2020

Sensors

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Ultrasonic distance sensors use an ultrasonic pulse’s time of flight to calculate the distance to the reflecting object. Widely used in industry, these sensors are an important component in autonomous vehicles, where they are used for such tasks as object avoidance and altitude measurement. The proper operation of such autonomous vehicles relies on sensor measurements; therefore, an adversary that has the ability to undermine the sensor’s reliability can pose a major risk to the vehicle. Previous attempts to alter the measurements of this sensor using an external signal succeeded in performing a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, in which the sensor’s reading showed a constant value, and a spoofing attack, in which the attacker could control the measurement to some extent. However, these attacks require precise knowledge of the sensor and its operation (e.g., timing of the ultrasonic pulse sent by the sensor). In this paper, we present an attack on ultrasonic distance sensors in which the measured distance can be altered (i.e., spoofing attack). The attack exploits a vulnerability discovered in the ultrasonic sensor’s receiver that results in a fake pulse that is produced by a constant noise in the input. A major advantage of the proposed attack is that, unlike previous attacks, a constant signal is used, and therefore, no prior knowledge of the sensor’s relative location or its timing behavior is required. We demonstrate the attack in both a lab setup (testbed) and a real setup involving a drone to demonstrate its feasibility. Our experiments show that the attack can interfere with the proper operation of the vehicle. In addition to the risk that the attack poses to autonomous vehicles, it can also be used as an effective defensive tool for restricting the movement of unauthorized autonomous vehicles within a protected area.

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SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security

Cited by 54 publications

References 61 publications

Security and Privacy in the Emerging Cyber-Physical World: A Survey

Security and Privacy in the Emerging Cyber-Physical World: A Survey

Signal Injection Attacks against CCD Image Sensors

Spoofing Attack on Ultrasonic Distance Sensors Using a Continuous Signal

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