Software control and intellectual property protection in cyber-physical systems

Abstract

Software control is a critical issue in cyber-physical systems (CPS); if the expected behavior of the software embedded in a single device of a CPS cannot be enforced then the behavior of the whole CPS may be in jeopardy. Thus, CPS stakeholders like having some level of control over the embedded software. Third-party demands to control the software, however, conflict with the intellectual property protection demanded by software developers, since some level of detail about the software at hand would have to be disclosed. In the present paper, we discuss the issue of controlling the software embedded in CPS devices and address the problem of how to achieve an increased level of software control without compromising the protection of intellectual property. We propose a two-party fingerprinting scheme that allows for attribution of responsibility in the case of intellectual property leaks. Our fingerprinting scheme is such that neither party may obtain an advantage over the other by misbehaving, misrepresenting or by prematurely aborting the protocol, therefore providing a fair means to resolve disputes.

The future of risk assessment

“…Resilience of CPS to failures can be granted by self-adaptiveness of control decisions on actuators, resorting to intelligent control systems that properly manipulate sensors measurements [116]. For example, Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controllers, typically used as feedback controller in CPS to retroact to actuators the actions to be undertaken for responding to changes of physical parameters, may suffer of software failures/errors (generated from inadequate specification, incomplete testing scope and algorithm/logic failures) that are latent and triggered only when context modifications are to be met [3,85].…”

A Non-parametric Cumulative Sum Approach for Online Diagnostics of Cyber Attacks to Nuclear Power Plants

“…Resilience of CPS to failures can be granted by self-adaptiveness of control decisions on actuators, resorting to intelligent control systems that properly manipulate sensors measurements (Machado et al, 2016). For example, Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controllers, typically used as feedback controller in CPS to retroact to actuators the actions to be undertaken for responding to changes of physical parameters, may suffer of software failures/errors (generated from inadequate specification, incomplete testing scope and algorithm/logic failures) that are latent and triggered only when context modifications are to be met (Aldemir et al, 2010;Jockenhövel-Barttfeld et al, 2016).…”

O encontro da Guerra Cibernética com as Guerras Eletrônica e Cinética no Âmbito do Poder Marítimo

“…Na área de segurança da informação, tais programas são particularmente desafiadores, na medida em que o comportamento de um ativo de Tecnologia de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) depende de seu software embarcado. Dessa forma, pesquisas vêm sendo desenvolvidas no sentido de aumentar a confiança em avaliações de segurança nas áreas de criptografia (MACHADO et al, 2016;KOWADA;2017), aleatoriedade (RIBEIRO et al 2018), protocolos de segurança (MACHADO et al, 2015), análise de software (BENTO, 2017, no prelo) e testes caixapreta (TELES; MACHADO, 2017).…”