SoftME: A Software-Based Memory Protection Approach for TEE System to Resist Physical Attacks

Zhang, Meiyu; Zhang, Qianying; Zhao, Shengmei; Shi, Zhiping; Guan, Yong

doi:10.1155/2019/8690853

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(31 reference statements)

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“…Henson and Taylor [22] describe a solution based on ARM architecture that implements a microkernel exploiting a cryptographic microprocessor to handle encrypted data either in a scratchpad memory or in the system RAM. An improvement of this idea is in [55], where the ARM TrustZone ensures that unencrypted data never leak to system RAM. The authors use the ARM Trusted Execution Environment to execute a microkernel that loads encrypted program from RAM, decrypt them, and run them safely.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

MemShield: GPU-Assisted Software Memory Encryption

Santucci¹,

Ingrassia²,

Picierro

et al. 2020

Applied Cryptography and Network Security

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Cryptographic algorithm implementations are vulnerable to Cold Boot attacks, which consist in exploiting the persistence of RAM cells across reboots or power down cycles to read the memory contents and recover precious sensitive data. The principal defensive weapon against Cold Boot attacks is memory encryption. In this work we propose MemShield, a memory encryption framework for user space applications that exploits a GPU to safely store the master key and perform the encryption/decryption operations. We developed a prototype that is completely transparent to existing applications and does not require changes to the OS kernel. We discuss the design, the related works, the implementation, the security analysis, and the performances of MemShield.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

MemShield: GPU-Assisted Software Memory Encryption

Santucci¹,

Ingrassia²,

Picierro

et al. 2020

Applied Cryptography and Network Security

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“…It provides security against both physical and software attacks. SoftME [26], CaSE [27], TrustShadow [28], and CryptMe [29] provide TEE system with approaches to resist physical attacks.…”

Section: A Arm Trustzone Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

MicroTEE: Designing TEE OS Based on the Microkernel Architecture

Zhang

Zhao

et al. 2019

2019 18th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications/13th IEEE International

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ARM TrustZone technology is widely used to provide Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for mobile devices. However, most TEE OSes are implemented as monolithic kernels. In such designs, device drivers, kernel services and kernel modules all run in the kernel, which results in large size of the kernel. It is difficult to guarantee that all components of the kernel have no security vulnerabilities in the monolithic kernel architecture, such as the integer overflow vulnerability in Qualcomm QSEE TrustZone and the TZDriver vulnerability in HUAWEI Hisilicon TEE architecture. This paper presents MicroTEE, a TEE OS based on the microkernel architecture. In MicroTEE, the microkernel provides strong isolation for TEE OS's basic services, such as crypto service and platform key management service. The kernel is only responsible for providing core services such as address space management, thread management, and inter-process communication. Other fundamental services, such as crypto service and platform key management service are implemented as applications at the user layer. Crypto Services and Key Management are used to provide Trusted Applications (TAs) with sensitive information encryption, data signing, and platform attestation functions. Our design avoids the compromise of the whole TEE OS if only one kernel service is vulnerable. A monitor has also been added to perform the switch between the secure world and the normal world. Finally, we implemented a MicroTEE prototype on the Freescale i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board and tested its performance. Evaluation results show that the performance of cryptographic operations in MicroTEE is better than it in Linux when the size of data is small.

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“…The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) is hailed as the third wave of world information development after computers and the Internet [56], with embedded systems as the driving force for technological development in many domains in the emerging post-PC era. As an increasing number of computational devices integrate into our lives in a pervasive and invisible way, security becomes critical for the dependability of all intelligent systems built upon these embedded systems [40].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection

Stajnrod

Yehuda

Zaidenberg

2021

J Comput Virol Hack Tech

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ARM TrustZone offers a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) embedded into the processor cores. Some vendors offer ARM modules that do not fully comply with TrustZone specifications, which may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In this paper, we present a DMA attack tutorial from the insecure world onto the secure world, and the design and implementation of this attack in a real insecure hardware.

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SoftME: A Software-Based Memory Protection Approach for TEE System to Resist Physical Attacks

Cited by 6 publications

References 32 publications

MemShield: GPU-Assisted Software Memory Encryption

MemShield: GPU-Assisted Software Memory Encryption

MicroTEE: Designing TEE OS Based on the Microkernel Architecture

Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection

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