Sir,Hull (1979, 1988) and his ally Beatty (1982) suggested that a non-evolutionary school of taxonomists -often (though misleadingly) called "pattern cladists"-had split off from legitimate cladists. At the time, some of the latter (Farris, 1985;Carpenter, 1987;Mishler, 1987) doubted that suggestion, but it will be shown here that those doubts were based on what has turned out to be incomplete or inaccurate information, while it is obvious from more recent literature (summarized by Farris, 2012b) that some former cladists have indeed reverted to a kind of pre-evolutionary taxonomy. That development, however, does not vindicate Hull's and Beatty's arguments, for it will also be shown that they were using the pattern cladistics question to promote other claims.
Sir,Hull (1979, 1988) and his ally Beatty (1982) suggested that a non-evolutionary school of taxonomists -often (though misleadingly) called "pattern cladists"-had split off from legitimate cladists. At the time, some of the latter (Farris, 1985;Carpenter, 1987;Mishler, 1987) doubted that suggestion, but it will be shown here that those doubts were based on what has turned out to be incomplete or inaccurate information, while it is obvious from more recent literature (summarized by Farris, 2012b) that some former cladists have indeed reverted to a kind of pre-evolutionary taxonomy. That development, however, does not vindicate Hull's and Beatty's arguments, for it will also be shown that they were using the pattern cladistics question to promote other claims. To see all this, first consider Beatty's (1982, p. 25) position:Disillusions concerning evolutionary theorizing have forced a split among cladists. The disillusioned group of "pattern" cladists seeks an evolutionarily neutral brand of cladistics. But pattern cladistics is not, after all, evolutionarily neutral. Rather, it is at odds with evolutionary theorizing.
Sir,Hull (1979, 1988) and his ally Beatty (1982) suggested that a non-evolutionary school of taxonomists -often (though misleadingly) called "pattern cladists"-had split off from legitimate cladists. At the time, some of the latter (Farris, 1985;Carpenter, 1987;Mishler, 1987) doubted that suggestion, but it will be shown here that those doubts were based on what has turned out to be incomplete or inaccurate information, while it is obvious from more recent literature (summarized by Farris, 2012b) that some former cladists have indeed reverted to a kind of pre-evolutionary taxonomy. That development, however, does not vindicate Hull's and Beatty's arguments, for it will also be shown that they were using the pattern cladistics question to promote other claims.
Sir,Hull (1979, 1988) and his ally Beatty (1982) suggested that a non-evolutionary school of taxonomists -often (though misleadingly) called "pattern cladists"-had split off from legitimate cladists. At the time, some of the latter (Farris, 1985;Carpenter, 1987;Mishler, 1987) doubted that suggestion, but it will be shown here that those doubts were based on what has turned out to be incomplete or inaccurate information, while it is obvious from more recent literature (summarized by Farris, 2012b) that some former cladists have indeed reverted to a kind of pre-evolutionary taxonomy. That development, however, does not vindicate Hull's and Beatty's arguments, for it will also be shown that they were using the pattern cladistics question to promote other claims. To see all this, first consider Beatty's (1982, p. 25) position:Disillusions concerning evolutionary theorizing have forced a split among cladists. The disillusioned group of "pattern" cladists seeks an evolutionarily neutral brand of cladistics. But pattern cladistics is not, after all, evolutionarily neutral. Rather, it is at odds with evolutionary theorizing.
“…In my experience as a systematist, the label 'pattern cladist' still does function as a derogatory label. Mishler (1987), Felsenstein (2001) and Funk (2001) offer three additional (though not completely neutral), contextualized views on 'pattern cladistics'. 25 For an outstanding review of the semantic dimensions of 'evolution', see Robert Richards' book The Meaning of Evolution (especially Chaps.…”
Section: Pattern Cladistics-'conceptual Evolution' Of Comparative Biomentioning
Despite the amount of work that has been produced on the subject over the years, the 'transformation of cladistics' is still a misunderstood episode in the history of comparative biology. Here, I analyze two outstanding, highly contrasting historiographic accounts on the matter, under the perspective of an influential dichotomy in the philosophy of science: the opposition between Scientific Realism and Empiricism. Placing special emphasis on the notion of 'causal grounding' of morphological characters (sensu Olivier Rieppel) in modern developmental biology's (mechanistic) theories, I arrive at the conclusion that a 'new transformation of cladistics' is philosophically plausible. This 'reformed' understanding of 'pattern cladistics' entails retaining the interpretation of cladograms as 'schemes of synapomorphies', but in association to construing cladogram nodes as 'developmental-genetic taxic homologies', instead of 'standard Darwinian ancestors'. The reinterpretation of pattern cladistics presented here additionally proposes to take Bas Van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism' as a philosophical stance that could properly support such analysis of developmental-genetic data for systematic purposes. The latter suggestion is justified through a reappraisal of previous ideas developed by prominent pattern cladists (mainly, Colin Patterson), which concerned a scientifically efficient 'observable/non-observable distinction' linked to the conceptual pair 'ontogeny and phylogeny'. Finally, I argue that a robust articulation of Antirealist alternatives in systematics may provide a rational basis for its disciplinary separation from evolutionary biology, as well as for a critical reconsideration of the proper role of certain Scientific Realist positions, currently popular in comparative biology.
“…The problem, of course, is that the definitions stayed associated with the label “pattern cladistics” leading cladists to unwittingly take the position of philosophers such as Greene and Hull when accusing patterns cladists of being “anti‐evolutionary” and “theory‐neutral” (see Williams and Ebach for a history). For example, Carpenter (), in a tongue‐and‐cheek article published in Cladistics , presented a “Cladistics of Cladists.” The article was a response to an earlier piece by bryologist Brent Mishler, who was a “naive graduate student [and] teaching fellow for Professor John Beatty (of pattern cladistics fame, 1982) in a course called ‘The Darwinian Revolution’” (Mishler, , p.55). Mishler wondered if pattern cladistics existed at all: “Is there a split within cladistics at present?…”
Section: Theoretical Issues and “Pattern Cladistics”mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I used to think so, when I thought in terms of ideological systems as phenetic clusters. But now I think that there is currently no split; perhaps the best evidence to offer is that we all attend meetings together” (Mishler, , p.59). Carpenter () was well aware of the split between pattern and phylogenetic cladistics and responded by constructing a data matrix based on characters resembling in‐house jokes within the Willi Hennig Society.…”
Section: Theoretical Issues and “Pattern Cladistics”mentioning
Ronald Brady was the first philosopher to defend pattern cladistics as an independent scientific field. That independence was achieved through the decoupling of biological systematics from phylogenetics––that is, inferred evolutionary processes (e.g. character transformation). Brady saw parallels between biological systematics and Wolfgang von Goethe's Morphology, an empirical scientific field that incorporates human observation and perception to discover coherent morphological structures. Goethe's Morphology and pre‐Darwinian systematics were independent from evolutionary narratives, a tradition that continued into the 20th Century through the work of biologists such as Agnes Arber. Most importantly, Brady provided the philosophical and historical foundations to an independent systematics by demonstrating the links between phenomenology, Goethe's Morphology and comparative biology.
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