Society, steward or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council

Wilson, Page

doi:10.1177/0010836715591711

Cited by 29 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…The Arctic Council can also be seen as the arena for a discursive competition between visions for its future. On this, see Wilson (2016). 7 See, for example, in relation to the Northern Sea Route (sometimes also termed 'Northeastern Passage') Moe (2014).…”

Section: Fundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governmentality of the Arctic as an international region

Albert¹,

Vasilache²

2017

Cooperation and Conflict

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Linked to the image of a wild and still-to-be-explored territory, as well as to images of the region as one of new economic opportunities, discourses on the Arctic also tie in with issues of climate change, cooperation and conflict, Arctic governance, international law and the situation and rights of indigenous people, as well as Great Power politics. Taken together, these aspects characterize a region whose formation is different from regionalization processes in other parts of the world. As the regional peculiarity of the Arctic is reflected by a variety and plurality of representations, discourses, perceptions and imaginaries, it can usefully be analyzed as a region of unfolding governmentality. The present article argues that the prospects for the Arctic are strongly intertwined with perceptions and depictions of it as an international region subject to emerging practices of governmentality. By drawing on both Foucault's texts and governmentality studies in international relations (IR), we discuss how the Arctic is affected by governmental security rationalities, by specific logics of political economy and order-building, as well as becoming a subject for biopolitical rationalizations and imaginaries. The discourses and practices of governmentality that permeate the Arctic contribute to its spatial, figurative and political reframing and are aimed at making it a governable region that can be addressed by, and accessible for, ordering rationalities and measures.

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Section: Fundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governmentality of the Arctic as an international region

Albert¹,

Vasilache²

2017

Cooperation and Conflict

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“…It was this group which produced the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, calling for greater coordination among the A5 on legal affairs relevant to the Arctic Ocean. Not only did this agreement draw concern from the three council members left outside the process, but the Declaration may have further pushed various nonArctic states, including China, to enter the council as observers to discourage a 'locking up' of the region (Dodds 2013;Wilson 2016). Even among the A5, however, there is disagreement over certain aspects of Arctic sovereignty and strategy, as evidenced both by the Russian rifts with the West, as well as the overlapping maritime claims within the central Arctic Ocean outside of the littoral states' maritime jurisdiction, a space colloquially referred to as the 'doughnut hole'.…”

Section: China and Arctic Institutions: Above Below And Beyond?mentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Have you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic

Lanteigne¹

2017

Polar Record

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The admission of China as an observer in the Arctic Council in 2013 was a significant step in the ongoing evolution of the country's Arctic policy, but Beijing is still concerned about being accepted as a regional player given its geography and arguably lack of an Arctic history. As the Arctic becomes more open to scientific and economic engagement, China wishes to develop the idea of the Arctic as more of an international space as opposed to strictly a regional one, and to allow non-Arctic states, such as China itself, to become accepted as Arctic actors. However, in order to avoid a backlash from the Arctic states and potential exclusion from the region's development, Beijing cannot effectively be a unilateral ‘norm-maker’ in the Arctic. Instead, China has sought to develop the identity of a regional ‘norm entrepreneur’, engaging the Arctic on many levels to promote the norm of partnerships between Arctic and non-Arctic actors to promote positive sum outcomes. Through engagement via several areas and governmental levels, Beijing hopes to succeed in being widely viewed as a ‘near-Arctic state’ which can contribute to new norms, and possibly new regimes, in an Arctic which shows many signs of becoming further internationalised.

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“…By bringing together more and more local, regional and international stakeholders, the growing density of actors in the forum has caused intense debates about Arctic international cooperation and the future role of the Arctic Council in regional governance (Pedersen, 2012;Wilson, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of Arctic international cooperation: Introducing a dataset on stakeholder participation in Arctic Council meetings, 1998–2015

Knecht¹

2016

Cooperation and Conflict

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Contemporary Arctic transformations and their global causes and consequences have put international cooperation in the Arctic Council, the region's most important forum for addressing Arctic affairs, at the forefront of research in Northern governance. With interest in Arctic regional affairs in world politics being at a historical high, the actual participation and contribution by interested actors to regional governance arrangements, such as the Arctic Council, has remained very much a blind spot. This article introduces and analyses a novel dataset on stakeholder participation in the Arctic Council (STAPAC) for all member states, Permanent Participants and observers in Ministerial, Senior Arctic Officials' and subsidiary body meetings between 1998 and 2015. The article finds that participation in the Arctic Council varies significantly across meeting levels and type of actors, and that new admissions to the Council, a source of major contestation in recent debates, do not necessarily result in more actors attending. The article further discusses these findings in light of three prevalent debates in Arctic governance research, and shows the empirical relevance of the STAPAC dataset for the study of Arctic cooperation and conflict, observer involvement in the Arctic Council system and political representation of indigenous Permanent Participants.

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Society, steward or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council

Cited by 29 publications

References 22 publications

Governmentality of the Arctic as an international region

Governmentality of the Arctic as an international region

‘Have you entered the storehouses of the snow?’ China as a norm entrepreneur in the Arctic

The politics of Arctic international cooperation: Introducing a dataset on stakeholder participation in Arctic Council meetings, 1998–2015

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