Socialization and hegemonic power

Abstract

Hegemons exercise power in the international system not only by manipulating material incentives but also by altering the substantive beliefs of elites in other nations. Socialization—the process through which leaders in these secondary states embrace a set of normative ideals articulated by the hegemon—plays an important role both in establishing an international order and in facilitating the functioning of that order. This article develops the notion of socialization in the international system and examines three hypotheses about the conditions under which it occurs and can function effectively as a source of power. The first hypothesis is that socialization occurs primarily after wars and political crises, periods marked by international turmoil and restructuring as well as by the fragmentation of ruling coalitions and legitimacy crises at the domestic level. The second is that elite (as opposed to mass) receptivity to the norms articulated by the hegemon is essential to the socialization process. The third hypothesis is that when socialization does occur, it comes about primarily in the wake of the coercive exercise of power. Material inducement triggers the socialization process, but socialization nevertheless leads to outcomes that are not explicable simply in terms of the manipulation of material incentives. These hypotheses are explored in the historical case studies of U.S. diplomacy after World Wars I and II and the British colonial experience in India and Egypt.

Claiming (back) the land: the geopolitics of Egyptian and South African land and water grabs

“…They have proved successful in this endeavour, with the help of side payments and, at times, open or veiled threats, in 'socialising' secondary powers in their region to accept their discourse (Ikenberry, 1990). In that sense we have looked at both the 'hard' (material) and 'soft power' aspects of resource claims.…”

The exception to the rule? The EU and India's challenge to the non-proliferation norm

“…Especially in elite-driven issue areas with a long tradition of formal negotiation and bargaining such as non-proliferation both material incentives and outright coercion can be expected to have an immediate effect (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). To this end, states have a toolbox with a wide range of classical instruments at their disposal.…”

“…In addition, states -or any other actor such as international organizations -can use more subtle forms of 'pressure', where the power of an argument supporting a norm challenge is enhanced by the support of an hegemonic power (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990) or any actor that plays an authorative model role (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).…”

A Longitudinal Analysis of the Indonesian Production Sharing Contracts (Psc): The Question of Economic Accountability

“…One can argue that these foreign companies will also bring with them their own self-interest agenda to influence the way a country like Indonesia manages the industry (Ikenberrry and Kupchan, 1990). This phenomenon was also supported when looking at comments of some local experts during the discussion of a new oil and gas law in Indonesia when they suspected that "this new oil and gas law is actually for the benefit of foreign interests" (Jakarta Post, 2001).…”