Social Status and the Overworked Consumer

Cahuc,; Postel-Vinay,

doi:10.2307/20079132

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…This separability assumption has often been employed (cf. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2005;Corneo, 2002, andPersson, 1995) because it substantially simplifies the formal analysis, without imposing too much structure on results. Moreover, given separability, KUJ (RAJ) is equivalent to u 12 > (<) 0 (cf.…”

Section: Set-upmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As such improvement creates a negative externality by reducing other individuals' positional utility, the incentives to work are excessive. Variants of this theoretical prediction have been derived by Seidman (1988), Persson (1995), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Corneo (2002), Dupor and Liu (2003), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2005), Alvarez-Cuadrado (2007), Tsoukis (2007), P erez-Asenjo (2011) and Goerke and Hillesheim (2013). In general, only one dimension of working time is considered.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Absence From Work, Sick Pay and Positional Consumption Concerns

Goerke

2019

Labour

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We analyse labour supply and absence from work choices, assuming that individual preferences exhibit relative consumption concerns. We show that contractual hours and the length of absence periods may vary equally with the strength of positional considerations. In this case, positional concerns do not affect their difference, i.e. overall or effective working time. Moreover, the nature and intensity of relative consumption effects influence the impact of sick pay and of true illness periods on contractual work hours and absence behaviour. Consequently, the profitability of employing individuals also varies with the strength of their positional concerns.

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Section: Set-upmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Absence From Work, Sick Pay and Positional Consumption Concerns

Goerke

2019

Labour

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“…Consequently, individual choices will result in In a number of contributions it has been argued (cf. Frank 1985, Schor 1991 or shown formally (see, e.g., Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2005, Persson 1995, Alvarez-Cuadrado 2007, Pérez-Asenjo 2011, Dodds 2012) that status concerns induce people to supply too much labour.…”

Section: Labour Supply and Labour Market Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Relative consumption, working time, and trade unions

Goerke

Hillesheim²

2013

Labour Economics

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“…They also argue that these policies may have had a more society-wide inßuence on leisure patterns because of a social multiplier where the returns to leisure increase as more people are taking longer vacations. In the presence of externalities, a very hard question to answer is whether labor regulation introduce distortions that reduce welfare or whether they are a way of coordinating on a more desirable equilibrium with fewer hours worked (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2005). On needs to know much more on these externalities to be able to yield some relevant answers to this type of questions.…”

Section: Reductions In Working Timementioning

confidence: 99%

4 Reduction of Working Time and Employment

Kramarz¹,

Cahuc²,

Crépon³

et al. 2008

Working Hours and Job Sharing in the EU and USA

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This chapter examines the theoretical underpinnings of the effects of work-sharing on employment. The analysis proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 is devoted to an analysis of labour demand when the firm chooses the number of jobs and hours. The interactions between employers' choice and workers' choice over hours, employment, and wages are studied in Section 4.3. Finally Section 4.4 provides some concluding comments. It is shown that compulsory reductions in standard hours can increase employment only in very special circumstances that are very rarely met in the real world. Cross-country differences in working time can be related to differences in institutions and cultures. Although imperfect competition may imply that state regulation of hours is required, this does not mean that systematic reductions in standard hours can improve employment or welfare.

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Social Status and the Overworked Consumer

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Absence From Work, Sick Pay and Positional Consumption Concerns

Absence From Work, Sick Pay and Positional Consumption Concerns

Relative consumption, working time, and trade unions

4 Reduction of Working Time and Employment

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