Social Shaping for Transactive Energy Systems

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of shaping agent utility functions in a transactive energy system to ensure the optimal energy price at a competitive equilibrium is always socially acceptable, that is, below a prescribed threshold. Agents in a distributed energy system aim to maximize their individual payoffs, as a combination of the utility of energy consumption and the income/expenditure from energy exchange. The utility function of each agent is parameterized by individual preference vectors, with the overall system operating at competitive equilibriums. We show the social shaping problem of the proposed transactive energy system is conceptually captured by a set decision problem. The set of agent preferences that guarantees a socially acceptable price is characterized by an implicit algebraic equation for strictly concave and continuously differentiable utility functions. We also present two analytical solutions where tight ranges for the coefficients of linear-quadratic utilities and piece-wise linear utilities are established under which optimal pricing is proven to be always socially acceptable.

Competitive equilibriums and social shaping for multi-agent systems

“…This work of transactive multi-agent systems over flow networks builds upon our previous work [8], [21], [22]. The idea of imposing flow/line capacity constraints is orginated from the work of [14], [18].…”

“…Effective resource allocation is a major focus for transactive multi-agent systems [7]. The goal of transactive multi-agent systems is to translate market coordination into local decisions that lead to optimal individual payoffs while maintaining systemlevel optimality [8]. In light of classical welfare economics theory, the careful pricing of the resource unit can possibly contribute to achieving this goal [9].…”