Social Security and the Determinants of Full and Partial Retirement:  A Competing Risks Analysis

Sueyoshi, Glenn T.

doi:10.3386/w3113

Cited by 19 publications

(21 citation statements)

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“…Because Germany has very few part-time employees, we model only two states-fully in the labor force and fully retired-unlike the competing-risk analysis of Sueyoshi (1989). We use definition I for retired, based on the self-assessed labor force status (see section 5.4.3).…”

Section: Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Micro-Modeling of Retirement Decisions in Germany

Börsch‐Supan¹,

Schnabel²,

Kohnz³

et al. 2003

Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World

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This is the introduction and summary to the ninth phase of an ongoing project on Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World. This project, which compares the experiences of a dozen developed countries, was launched in the mid 1990s, following decades of decline in the labor force participation rate of older men. The first several phases of the project document that social security program provisions can create powerful incentives for retirement that are strongly correlated with the labor force behavior of older workers. Subsequent phases of the project have explored how disability program provisions affect retirement, whether there is a link between older employment and youth unemployment, and whether older individuals are healthy enough to work longer. In the two decades since the project began, the dramatic decline in men's labor force participation has been replaced by sharply rising participation rates. Older women's participation has increased dramatically as well. In our last study, we investigated some potential causes of rising participation, include changes in health and education. As we noted then, countries have undertaken numerous reforms of their social security programs, disability programs, and other public benefit programs available to older workers over the same period during which participation has increased. In this ninth phase of the project, we explore how the financial incentive to work at older ages has evolved from 1980 to the present. We highlight the important role of reforms in these changing incentives and examine how changing incentives may have affected retirement behavior.

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Section: Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Micro-Modeling of Retirement Decisions in Germany

Börsch‐Supan¹,

Schnabel²,

Kohnz³

et al. 2003

Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…reduced-form models, but to incorporate the accrual of SSW with a year of additional work; examples here include Fields and Mitchell (1984), Hausman and Wise (1985), and Sueyoshi (1989). Both of these types of studies continued to find an important, but modest, role for Social Security, and some (such as Fields and Mitchell) indicated a larger role for private pensions.…”

Section: B Previous Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Future Social Security Entitlements and the Retirement Decision

Coile

Gruber

2007

Review of Economics and Statistics

242

216

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Abstract-A critical question for Social Security policy is how program incentives affect retirement behavior. We use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to examine the impact of Social Security incentives on male retirement. We implement forward-looking models whereby individuals consider the incentives to work in all future years. We find that forwardlooking incentive measures for Social Security are significant determinants of retirement. We also find that private pension incentives have roughly similar effects. Our findings suggest that Social Security policies that increase the incentives to work at older ages can significantly reduce the labor force exit rate of older workers.

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“…Steinmeier (1984a, 2000) found estimates of the average duration in gradual retirement of 2.55 years in the HRS and 2.76 years in the older RHS data. In contrast, Sueyoshi (1989) estimated a much longer average duration using the RHS, using a different definition of gradual retirement. (Sueyoshi, 1989, Table 2) found that in the RHS, direct retirees left full employment at an average age of 64.8 years.…”

Section: Sequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gustman and Steinmeier (1984b), Honig and Hanoch (1985) and Sueyoshi (1989) used RHS data for this analysis. Here, we focus on three studies that have used the more recent data from the HRS.…”

Section: Correlates Of Gradual Retirementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gradual Retirement: Preferences and Limitations

Kantarci

Soest

2008

De Economist

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SummaryIn the traditional retirement scenario, individuals work full-time or part-time until a given age, and then stop working abruptly. From the individual's point of view, it seems more attractive to have a smooth transition, with gradual retirement. In Sweden and other European countries, specific gradual retirement programs have been created in the past 20 years, first in combination with early retirement programs and later to increase labour market participation of older workers. This paper surveys the existing literature on gradual retirement in the US and Europe and analyzes the relevance of gradual retirement in the Netherlands as a tool to keep people employed longer.

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Social Security and the Determinants of Full and Partial Retirement: A Competing Risks Analysis

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Micro-Modeling of Retirement Decisions in Germany

Micro-Modeling of Retirement Decisions in Germany

Future Social Security Entitlements and the Retirement Decision

Gradual Retirement: Preferences and Limitations

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