Social schemas, cognitive complexity, and the learning of social structures¹

Abstract

There is a striking parallelism between Heider's balance prmciple (1946, 1958) and Desoto's ordenng schema (DeSoto, i960, 1961, Henley, Horsfall, & DeSoto, 1969. At the general level, of course, the two principles sprmg from similar theoretical approaches Both positions are Cestaltist, as refiected m their concern for the pattern of relations among a set of elements, both are also phenomenological, m the sense that they are much more concemed with how perceivers construe the relationships among elements than with how the relationships actually occur m the real world (DeSoto, 1961; DeSoto & Albrecht, 1968a, 1968b. Beyond this general similarity, both pnnciples make specific predictions about the formal properties that perceivers will apply to particular kinds of social relations Accordmg to the balance prmciple, perceivers act as though the liking relation defined on a group of people is symmetric and transitive, accordmg to the ordenng schema, they act as though order-like relations, such as dominates or influences, are asymmetnc and transitive. DeSoto and Keuthe (1959) have shown that perceivers' inferences from mcomplete information do, in fact, operate according to the postulated formal properties, symmetry and transitivity charaterize expectations about liking, asymmetry and transitivity characterize expectations about dominanceThe assumption that formal properties are regularly attributed to particidar social relations provides unequivocal predictions 1 The resaarcb repwrted in tins study was siq)ported in part by researdi ^ant MH 16563 from Ae National Institute of Mental Health The paper is based <m a dissertation submitted by the seasat author as partial fulfillment of requirements for tbe Ph D degree at the Umversity of Kansas. A preliminary report of this r^earcfa was presented at the 1970 meeting of the American I%diolo^cal for reprais should be addressed to Jesse G Ddia, Department di imunication, 244 Iancoln Hall, University dt Illinois, Uri»na, Illinois

More evidence that cognitive complexity isnotloquacity: A reply to Beatty and Payne

“…Presently, however, there are no valid conceptual or empirical reasons for believing that the RCQ measure of cognitive complexity is meaningfully confounded by general verbal abilities or proclivities. Indeed, the results of prior research (Applegate et al, 1985;Burleson et al, 1981;Burleson & Rowan, 1985;Crockett, 1965;Delia, 1978;Delia & Crockett, 1973;Hale, 1980;Press et al, 1969;O'Keefe & Sypher, 1981;Scarlett et al, 1971;Sypher & Applegate, 1982) as well as the results of the two studies reported here strongly suggest that the RCQ measure of cognitive complexity is unconfounded by general verbal traits or capacities. Future attacks on the RCQ must carefully address the extensive evidence supporting the reliability and validity of this measure.…”

“…In particular, Crockett's RCQ procedure for assessing interpersonal cognitive complexity has repreatedly been shown free from such potentially confounding influences as verbal intelligence, verbal fluency, general intellectual abilities (IQ), grade point average, performance on standardized test such as the SAT, narrative writing skills, and writing speed (e.g. Applegate, Burke, Burleson, Delia, & Kline, 1985;Burleson et al, 1981;Burleson & Rowan, 1985;Crockett, 1965;Delia, 1978;Delia & Crockett, 1973;Hale, 1980;Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz, 1969;Scarlett, Press, & Crockett, 1971;Sypher & Applegate, 1982).…”

Factors affecting balance, agreement and positivity biases in POQ and POX triads

“…A further reason is suggested from the view ofJones and Nisbett (1972) that an actor-observer (analogous to P = S) may not act at the peak of cognitive complexity but is likely to use 'simplifying assumptions about the environment' (p. 87). It has been shown (Delia and Crockett, 1973;Press et al, 1969;Steinitz, 1969), that cognitively simple subjects tend to balance structures, and that structures forming part of a simple cognitive domain are more likely to be balanced than those forming part of a complex cognitive domain (Scott, 1963). Such studies strengthen the view that when P = S he may be acting as though cognitively simple and thus tend to form and prefer balanced triads.…”

Structure of interpersonal construct systems: One system or many?

“…Burleson (1987) cited more than 40 studies that support this relationship. Other constructivist studies have shown that construct systems become more differentiated with age and are characterized by a change from concrete to abstract (Scarlett, Press, & Crockett, 1971), that females' construct systems are generally more complex than males' (Delia, Clark, & Switzer, 1974), that persons with complex systems are better able to integrate inconsistent information and behavior (Nidorf & Crockett, 1965), that cognitively complex persons are better able to take others' perspectives in social situations (Hale & Delia, 1976), that cognitively complex persons are not as dependent as cognitively simple persons on simplifying cognitive schemas when trying to understand social situations (Delia & Crockett, 1973), and that persons with more complex systems are more likely than those with less complex systems to be upwardly mobile in organizational settings (B. D. Sypher & Zorn, 1986).…”