Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game

Abstract

We perform meta-regressions on a single database containing 96 observations of simple ultimatum games and 144 observations of simple dictator games to disentangle the fairness hypothesis based on the degree of economic development of a country. According to the fairness hypothesis, offers in the two games should not differ if they were motivated by a subject's fairness concerns. Using the difference across countries between offers in ultimatum and dictator games, we address the effect of being exposed to the market mechanism on pure fairness concerns and other-regarding, expectations-driven fairness. Our results show in particular that the lower the level of economic development in a country, the less likely the rejection of the fairness hypothesis.

Social preferences and psychopathy in a sample of male prisoners

“…60% of participants gave the same amount in both games. Of the remaining 40%, all but one participant (37.14%) gave the other person more money in the Ultimatum Game than in the Dictator Game, which is to be expected 26 .…”

“…Compared to previous studies, our participants were surprisingly generous. A recent meta-analysis 26 of studies using Dictator Games and Ultimatum Games found that people offer the other person on average 25% of the money in the Dictator Game and 42% in the Ultimatum Game. In our study, participants offered the other person on average 41% of the money in the Dictator Game and 50% in the Ultimatum Game, thus offering the other person much more than other studies typically find.…”

How Do Politicians Bargain? Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries

“…These results are perhaps best understood when compared with existing findings on how non-elites play the ultimatum game. Meta-analyses of ultimatum game studies find that proposals in industrialized societies amount to about 40%–43% of the shared pie, on average, and rarely exceed 50% (Cochard et al 2021; Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Van De Kuilen 2004; Tisserand 2014, see also Eckel and Grossman 2001). The offers made by politicians in our sample are substantially higher, averaging 54% of the endowment, or 11–14 percentage points (pp) higher than those population figures.…”

Factores influyentes en la asignación de ayudas a futbolistas: rendimiento o situación social

“…Además, Brañas (2006) realiza una investigación del efecto de la pobreza en la aplicación del juego del dictador forzando la aversión a la inequidad, manifestándoles a los participantes con el rol del dictador que los beneficiarios provenían de países con recursos escasos. De manera análoga, Bolton et al (1998) presentan un proceso de decisión hipotético, donde le otorgan al rol del dictador reglas sociales y personales que limitan de manera eficaz el comportamiento egoísta; y Cochard et al (2021) donde estudian las diferencias en las ofertas en los juegos del ultimátum y dictador en varios países con una hipótesis de equidad, encontrando que las personas de países más desarrollados tienden a dar menos en las ofertas del juego del dictador.…”