Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Swope, Kurtis; Cadigan, John; Schmitt, Pamela; Shupp, Robert

doi:10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00865.x

Cited by 20 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…A number of papers have explored whether the Dictator Game in the Take frame gives rise to greater pro-sociality than the same game in the Give frame. Swope et al (2008) and Krupka and Weber (2013) have found that, indeed, participants tend to be more pro-social in the Take frame than in the Give frame. Moreover, Krupka and Weber (2013) have shown that the rate of pro-sociality can be predicted by what they called "social appropriateness" of an action.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Previous works have mainly focused on whether the DG in the Take frame gives rise to higher pro-sociality than the same game in the Give frame. Swope et al (2008) have found that participants tend to be more pro-social in the DG in the Take frame than in the DG in the Give frame. In the Take frame, the endowment was initially given to the recipient, and dictators could take any amount.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

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The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game

Capraro¹,

Vanzo

2019

Judgm. decis. mak.

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Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades. For example, several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results. Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In Study 1 (N=567) we implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets $0.50 and the recipient gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets $0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing the available actions using six terms, from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N=221) we ask brand new participants to rate each of the words used in Study 1 from “extremely wrong” to “extremely right”. We find that these moral judgments can explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme Dictator game can be generated using morally loaded language.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game

Capraro¹,

Vanzo

2019

Judgm. decis. mak.

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“…In that case, each participant makes a dictator decision after which the dictator’s or the receiver’s payoff is randomly selected to each player. This game type increases the equality of allocations, and participants’ decisions behind the veil reflect their risk attitudes [ 13 , 14 ].…”

Section: Role Awareness and Dictator Game Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of role awareness, empathy induction and trait empathy on dictator game giving

et al. 2022

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We ask how state empathy, trait empathy, and role awareness influence dictator game giving in a monetarily incentivized experiment. We manipulated two factors: role awareness (role certainty vs. role uncertainty) and state empathy induction (no empathy induction vs. empathy induction). Under role uncertainty, participants did not know their role as a dictator or a recipient when making their choices. State empathy was induced by asking the dictators to consider what the recipient would feel when learning about the decision. Each participant was randomly assigned into one of the four conditions, and in each condition, participants were randomly assigned into dictator and receiver roles. The role assignment took place before or after decisions were made, depending on the condition. We also studied the direct influence of trait empathy on dictator game giving as well as its interaction with the experimental manipulations. Trait empathy was measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE) before the experiment. Of our experimental manipulations, role awareness had an effect on dictator game giving; participants donated more under role uncertainty than under role certainty. Instead, we did not observe an effect of state empathy induction. Of trait empathy subscales, only affective empathy was positively associated with dictator game giving. Finally, role awareness did not influence all participants similarly but had a larger impact on those with low scores on trait empathic concern or trait affective empathy. Our results indicate that specific measures to induce altruistic sharing can be effective but their effect may vary depending on certain personal characteristics.

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“…One line explored dictators' behavior in variants of the dictator game in which the initial endowment is not given to the dictator, but is instead given to the recipient, or equally shared between the dictator and the recipient, and the dictator can take some of the recipient's endowment; this is called the "take" frame. Some experiments showed that people tend to be more altruistic in the dictator game in the "take" frame than in the standard dictator game (Swope et al, 2008;Krupka and Weber, 2013); moreover, this effect is driven by the perception of what the socially appropriate action is (Krupka and Weber, 2013).…”

Section: Experimental Regularitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

From outcome-based to language-based preferences

Capraro¹,

Halpern²,

Perc³

2022

Preprint

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We review the literature on models that try to explain human behavior in social interactions described by normal-form games with monetary payoffs. We start by covering social and moral preferences. We then focus on the growing body of research showing that people react to the language in which actions are described, especially when it activates moral concerns. We conclude by arguing that behavioral economics is in the midst of a paradigm shift towards language-based preferences, which will require an exploration of new models and experimental setups.

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Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence

Cited by 20 publications

References 21 publications

The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game

The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game

The influence of role awareness, empathy induction and trait empathy on dictator game giving

From outcome-based to language-based preferences

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