Social Order in a Fragile State: Rio's Favelas

Abstract

A peculiar social order exists in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, where the drug factions that control them permit humanitarian activity which curbs drug use and faction affiliation. This article provides an institutional perspective on faction control of the favelas where a lack of government presence fosters faction legitimacy among residents. Allowing humanitarian organisations to operate in the favelas creates common knowledge among residents within a large coordination game where factions signal a desire to cooperate. Legitimisation among residents improves faction profits, while residents benefit from ‘law and order’, public services and public goods that are not provided by the state.

Entrepreneurship prompts institutional change in developing economies

“…One example is the drug factions controlling the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, who, in addition to providing customary law ("the law of the hill") and government-type services like clean water and welfare assistance, willingly tolerate and even protect humanitarian organizations that operate in their territory to weaken the drug trade and reduce violence (Rodet 2016). The establishment of such "semi-formal but illegitimate institutions" (Sutter et al 2013) is a common practice to fill the void left by weak or non-existant formal institutions in developing countries (World Bank 2011;…”

Negotiating Violence and Protection in Prison and on the Outside: The Organizational Evolution of the Transnational Prison Gang Barrio Azteca

“…Accounts of prison gangs’ formation typically, though not always, focus on how inmate groups develop in response to the protection market in prison rather than on how a specific street gang transforms itself into a prison gang (Camp & Camp, 1985; Gundur, 2018; Irwin, 1980; Skarbek, 2011; Tapia, 2018; Trammell, 2012). Prison gangs that operate in both carceral and free settings, albeit within distinct contexts and criminal marketplaces, mark a dynamic that has attracted scholarly attention in the United States, Latin America, and elsewhere (Fontes, 2018; Lindegaard & Gear, 2014; Rodet, 2016; Skarbek, 2014, 2016; Skarbek & Freire, 2018), a multifaceted context exemplified by the focus of this article: the organizational history of Barrio Azteca.…”

“…Security threat groups, colloquially known as prison gangs, develop, by definition, in confinement, but sometimes go on to expand into the free world. In particular, U.S.-based Hispanic and Latin American prison gangs, which often contribute to prison governance structures, have, in certain circumstances, evolved to underwrite the protection rackets that underpin criminal underworlds on the outside (Skarbek, 2014), typically via the drug trade (Bunker & Sullivan, 2013; Cruz, 2010; Dias & Darke, 2016; Dias & Salla, 2013; Dudley, 2011; Fontes, 2016, 2018; Grillo, 2011; Kan, 2012; Logan, 2009; Manwaring, 2007; Rodet, 2016; Santamaría, 2013; Savenije, 2004; Sullivan & Bunker, 2002; Willis, 2009; Wolf, 2010). While such initial, in-prison development and subsequent expansion into the free world are of interest to the literature (Ouellet, Bouchard, & Charette, 2018), the mechanisms driving them remain largely unexplored.…”

“The pandemic only gave visibility to what is invisible”: a qualitative analysis of structural violence during COVID-19 and impacts on gender-based violence in Brazil

“…Growth and expansion of Brazilian favelas occurred during the rapid industrialization of the 1950-1970s, although favelas have existed since the late 1800s due to the rising cost of living in the city and the desire for workers to reside closer to their workplaces [ 6 , 7 ]. Favelas are self-organized—and often self-reliant—entities; aside from the militaristic presence of the police, favelas largely operate outside the range of the State [ 8 , 9 ].…”