Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Townsend, Leo

doi:10.1515/jso-2014-0040

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…According to Tuomela (2013 , p. 195), in certain cases, but also only in certain cases, group identification (or, in his parlance, the adoption of a we-mode) is intentional. Although it has been pointed out that this view is not without tension ( Townsend, 2014 , Petersson, unpublished manuscript), it appears to fit the results of our analysis: in fact, one could claim that relevant desires on the side of the group-identifier do play a causal role for hetero-induced pride, whereas no such desires can be ascertained in the case of hetero-induced shame. This approach, however, would still have to explain why in certain circumstances group identification is an intentional process and why in other cases this description does not hold.…”

Section: Group Identification In the Light Of Hetero-induced Self-consupporting

confidence: 63%

Pride, Shame, and Group Identification

Salice

Sánchez

2016

Front. Psychol.

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Self-conscious emotions such as shame and pride are emotions that typically focus on the self of the person who feels them. In other words, the intentional object of these emotions is assumed to be the subject that experiences them. Many reasons speak in its favor and yet this account seems to leave a question open: how to cash out those cases in which one genuinely feels ashamed or proud of what someone else does? This paper contends that such cases do not necessarily challenge the idea that shame and pride are about the emoting subject. Rather, we claim that some of the most paradigmatic scenarios of shame and pride induced by others can be accommodated by taking seriously the consideration that, in such cases, the subject “group-identifies” with the other. This is the idea that, in feeling these forms of shame or pride, the subject is conceiving of herself as a member of the same group as the subject acting shamefully or in an admirable way. In other words, these peculiar emotive responses are elicited in the subject insofar as, and to the extent that, she is (or sees herself as being) a member of a group – the group to which those who act shamefully or admirably also belong. By looking into the way in which the notion of group identification can allow for an account of hetero-induced shame and pride, this paper attempts to achieve a sort of mutual enlightenment that brings to light not only an important and generally neglected form of self-conscious emotions, but also relevant features of group identification. In particular, it generates evidence for the idea that group identification is a psychological process that the subject does not have to carry out intentionally in the sense that it is not necessarily triggered by the subject’s conative states like desires or intentions.

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Section: Group Identification In the Light Of Hetero-induced Self-consupporting

confidence: 63%

Pride, Shame, and Group Identification

Salice

Sánchez

2016

Front. Psychol.

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“…In general, while social context is seen to influence remembering, the act of remembering is held to be individual. However the literature on collective intentionality ( [27]) considers collective memory as a form of collective attention to the past. The concepts underlying the model we discuss below are greatly inspired by the "we-mode", discussed by the philosopher Raimo Tuomela, though we place an additional emphasis on patterns of social interaction (rather than the interactions themselves).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The question, of course, is, who is this we referred to here ? Clearly this we is a social construction, one that depends on the very social norms and social values that we wish to reason about ( [27]). Integral to such social construction of a collective is the memory ascribed to that collective.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning about Emergence of Collective Memory

Ramanujam

2021

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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We offer a very simple model of how collective memory may form. Agents keep signalling within neighbourhoods, and depending on how many support each signal, some signals "win" in that neighbourhood. By agents interacting between different neighbourhoods, 'influence' spreads and sometimes, a collective signal emerges. We propose a logic in which we can reason about such emergence of memory and present preliminary technical results on the logic.

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Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Petersson

2016

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117–147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264–265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on the conditions on collective action and intention that need to be fulfilled for Bacharach’s “team reasoning” to occur. Two influential approaches to collective action are related to the idea of team reasoning: Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intention and Raimo Tuomela’s theory of a we-mode of intending. I argue that neither captures the “agency transformation” that team reasoning requires. That might be an acceptable conclusion for Bratman but more problematic for Tuomela, who claims that Bacharach’s results support his theory. I sketch an alternative framework in which the perspectival element that is required for team reasoning - the ‘we-perspective’ - can be understood and functionally characterized in relation to the traditional distinction between mode and content of intentional states. I claim that the latter understanding of a collective perspective provides the right kind of philosophical background for team reasoning, and I discuss some implications in relation to Tuomela’s assumption that switching between individual and collective perspectives can be a matter of rational choice.

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Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Pride, Shame, and Group Identification

Pride, Shame, and Group Identification

Reasoning about Emergence of Collective Memory

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

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