Social Norms, Behavioral Payment Programs, and Cooperative Behaviors: Toward a Theory of Financial Incentives in Normative Systems

Abstract

Descriptive and injunctive social norms communicated among groups are known to influence behavior, yet little is known about how they evolve over time and how financial incentives influence norms. This article tests hypotheses about the ways in which monetary incentives can disrupt normative impact while facilitating cooperative behavior. The results of a public goods experiment indicate that the presence of a financial incentive for behavior can reduce the impact of perceived descriptive norms on behavior, and this reduction continues once the incentive is removed. The findings show that group identification enhances the effects of perceived descriptive norms on contribution behavior. The study results form the basis for theory building on the role of financial incentives in normative systems (FINS).

A Re-Explication of Social Norms, Ten Years Later

“…They found that collective norms predicted individual condom use and that this influence was further augmented by heightened interpersonal discussions around the topic. In the second study, Lapinski, Kerr, Zhao, and Shupp () operationalized collective norms as the aggregated prevalence of actual behaviors of group members across trials in an experiment. They manipulated the presence of a financial incentive and sorted participants based on initial cooperation levels, finding that both descriptive and collective norms about donating to a financial pool predicted individuals' own contributions.…”

Long-Term Effects of Payments for Environmental Services: Combining Insights from Communication and Economics

“…Lapinski et al [26] tested the FINS model by using a public goods experiment in a campus computer laboratory setting in the U.S. In a public goods experiment, subjects had to decide how much to contribute between a public account, which maximized the benefits to the group as a whole, and a private account, which maximizes their own personal gain.…”

“…We present a nontechnical summary of an interdisciplinary model that combines insights from economics and communication sciences to examine the interaction of financial incentives and social norms in PES and other behavioral payment programs. (A more technical treatment of the model, with implications for the communication sciences literature, can be found in [26].) Our model takes advantage of the much greater nuance with which the communication literature treats social norms than the economics and institutions literatures, which tend to dominate the academic discussion of PES.…”

The optimal control of Axelrod's social norm game

“…Lapinski et al (2017) provide an interesting study about the influence of financial incentives on the public good game. Their study explores the long‐term effect of behavioral payment programs especially when the financial incentives are offered in a short term …”

“…6 A novel work by De et al (2017) involves cultural inertia and social norm change in an evolutionary game to explore the societies' sensitivity for coordination, which might lead to norm change. 7 Lapinski et al (2017) provide an interesting study about the influence of financial incentives on the public good game. Their study explores the long-term effect of behavioral payment programs especially when the financial incentives are offered in a short term.…”