2012
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0099-y
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(Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust

Abstract: What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.

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Cited by 10 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 126 publications
(140 reference statements)
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“…Neuropsychological evidence from clinical populations supports this assertion. For example, patients with semantic dementia, in which the conceptual knowledge base is progressively eroded, display marked impairments in constructing novel future events, despite a relative preservation of episodic memory (Irish et al 2012a;2012b). These impairments in mental simulation are attributable to atrophy of specialized semantic processing regions in the anterior temporal lobes (reviewed by Irish & Piolino 2016).…”
Section: Robyn Fivushmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Neuropsychological evidence from clinical populations supports this assertion. For example, patients with semantic dementia, in which the conceptual knowledge base is progressively eroded, display marked impairments in constructing novel future events, despite a relative preservation of episodic memory (Irish et al 2012a;2012b). These impairments in mental simulation are attributable to atrophy of specialized semantic processing regions in the anterior temporal lobes (reviewed by Irish & Piolino 2016).…”
Section: Robyn Fivushmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is accomplished by applying a source tag to these contents, which governs how they can be further used in inference. Indeed, source-monitoring mechanisms seem to fill the role of such decoupling processes; they effectively endorse contents under a given description (Michaelian 2012a; 2012b).…”
Section: What Is Episodic Memory?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, there is good evidence that people in general take their own experiences and behaviors as a default model to infer other people's motivations and behaviors [33] in the sense of social metacognitions [34,35] or theory of mind [36]. Thus, people might project their experience of an information overload into different subgroups of their potential audience.…”
Section: The Subjective Collective-privacy Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The external version of the endorsement problem has both non-social and social forms, and the latter brings distributed memory research into contact with human communication research, which looks at the factors influencing the decision to trust information received from another agent (Sperber et al 2010). Much of this research is pessimistic with respect to our sensitivity to deception (Michaelian 2012c); a question for future research is thus whether the results of human communication research should temper the optimism of Arango-Muñoz's view of the reliability of scaffolded memory. Such research should take into account the non-cognitive factors emphasized by Fagin, Yamashiro, and Hirst.…”
Section: What Are the Implications Of Human Communication Research Fomentioning
confidence: 95%