Social Mereology

Abstract

What kind of entity is a committee, a book group or a band? I argue that committees and other such social groups are concrete, composite particulars, having ordinary human beings amongst their parts. So the committee members are literally parts of the committee. This mereological view of social groups was popular several decades ago, but fell out of favour following influential objections from David-Hillel Ruben. But recent years have seen a tidal wave of work in metaphysics, including the metaphysics of parts and wholes. We now have the resources to rehabilitate the mereological view of social groups. I show how this can be done, and why we should bother.

How Individuals Constitute Group Agents

“…29 If one adopts a nonextensional approach to mereology, then SCV's treatment of fusions as the constituents of groups does guarantee the ability of groups to survive changes in membership (Hawley 2017). simultaneously constitute groups of distinct types, this is in virtue of their simultaneous realization of distinct functional structures.…”

“…Yet there is little temptation to argue that the human individual constitutes both a chess player and a boxer, where these entities are distinct. Hawley (2017) presses this point forcefully, arguing that the apparent inappropriateness of relationally individuating individuals cuts against the plausibility of relationally individuating groups. Hawley argues on this basis that the possibility of coextensive yet distinct groups need not be accommodated.…”

“…Some philosophers find the view that groups are spatially coincident with their members to be implausible(Ruben 1983(Ruben , 1985. Others argue that at least some groups are located where their members are(Ritchie 2013;Hawley 2017). Should it turn out that groups are not spatially located or are located in a location different to that of their members, any constitution view of group agents that treats this relation as a variety of material constitution would prove untenable.…”

“…For instance, seeWilson (2008) andHawley (2017).17 One might attempt to cut down on cases of constitution by appeal to resources likeBaker's (2000) "primary kinds." However, asWilson (2008) notes, even an appeal to primary kind cannot adequately cut down on the number of cases of constitution to which it is committed.18 That even lone individuals may constitute groups on Epstein's view underscores that Epstein's answer to the IVW question rests strictly on the satisfaction of extrinsic conditions.19 Though it bears noting that Epstein is not alone in the commitment(Jansen 2009).…”

“…Hawley (2017) has recently defended the view that groups are mereological fusions of individuals against David-HillelRuben's (1983;1985) objections to that view, which were long taken to be decisive.21 Hawley's claim is broader than this-that social groups in general are mereological fusions of their members. I address only the implication of this general claim for group agents in particular.…”