Social Judgement Theory

Pseudocontingencies can override genuine contingencies between multiple cues

“…The present results highlight how unlikely it is that participants can keep in memory a blown-up contingency array or, alternatively, a high-fidelity exemplar-based record of all individual stimulus observations. This unsurprising result was hardly considered in previous studies on multiple-cue learning (Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 2006;Shanks, 1990), inspired by the lens model (Brunswik, 1943), social judgment theory (Doherty & Kurz, 1996), and cue redundancy effects (Garner, 1974). In virtually all of this prior work, it was presupposed that organisms extract correlations proper, on the basis of an exhaustive assessment of joint frequencies in a sample of stimulus observations.…”

The influence of information redundancy on probabilistic inferences

“…How people's inferences are influenced by information redundancy has been addressed in the neo-Brunswikian "social judgment theory" research (Brehmer & Joyce, 1988;Cooksey, 1996;Doherty & Kurz, 1996). This is not a coincidence.…”

Experts and Decision Making: First Steps towards a Unifying Theory of Decision Making in Novices, Intermediates and Experts

“…Beach & Mitchell, 1978;Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999;Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988. Automatic processing got less attention in decision research for a long time (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; but see Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993;Doherty & Kurz, 1996;Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999;Epstein, 1990;Evans, 2008;Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987;Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007;Sloman, 2002). 3 In contrast to these approaches, the PCS model of decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; for earlier accounts, see Simon, 1999 andThagard &Millgram, 1995) assumes a primacy of automatic processes and ascribes deliberate processes (only) a supporting part for the optimization of decisions (see Figure 1).…”

“…As stated by the Brunswikian lens model (Brunswik, 1955) and social judgment theory (see Doherty & Kurz, 1996, for an overview), experience and feedback should over time lead to better judgments because people learn how to weight different cues to predict specific outcomes (i.e., people might improve their adjustment of cue validities to the structure of the environment). Experience could also lead to the development of routines of option choices, which are selected in similar situations without further deliberation (Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001).…”