Social Hierarchies and the Formation of Customary Property Law in Pre-Industrial China and England

Abstract

Comparative lawyers and economists have often assumed that traditional Chinese laws and customs reinforced the economic and political dominance of elites and, therefore, were unusually "despotic" towards the poor. Such assumptions are highly questionable: Quite the opposite, one of the most striking characteristics of Qing and Republican property institutions is that they often gave significantly greater economic protection to the poorer segments of society than comparable institutions in early modern England. In particular, Chinese property customs afforded much stronger powers of redemption to landowners who had pawned their land. In both societies, land-pawning occurred far more frequently among poorer households than richer ones, but Chinese customary law allowed debtors to indefinitely retain redemption rights over collateralized property, whereas English debtors would generally lose the property permanently if they failed to redeem within one year.This article argues that the comparatively "egalitarian" tendencies of Qing and Republican property institutions stemmed from the different ways Chinese and English rural communities allocated social status and rank. Hierarchical "Confucian" kinship networks dominated social and economic life in most Chinese villages. Within these networks, an individual's status and rank depended, in large part, on his age and generational seniority, rather than personal wealth. This allowed many low-income households to enjoy status and rank quite disproportionate to their wealth. In comparison, substantial landed wealth was generally a prerequisite for high status in early modern England, effectively excluding lower-income households from positions of sociopolitical authority. Chinese smallholders possessed, therefore, significantly more social bargaining power, and were more capable of negotiating desirable property institutions. Paradoxically, the predominance of kinship hierarchies actually enhanced macro-level political and economic equality. Category: Comparative Legal History

The regulation of customary practices under colonial administration: Kinship and mortgages in a Hong Kong village

“…This feature was found to be very different from English practice, where the mortgagee would obtain full ownership of the collateral if the mortgagor failed to redeem it within one year. 14 Stewart Lockhart, a senior British colonial administrator in the early 19th century, mentioned that 'if the value of land should go up the mortgagor naturally claims to redeem but the mortgagee frequently resists on the ground that the sale was unconditional'. 15 He also pointed out that 'mortgages are frequently assigned three or four times over and this of course increases the possibilities of dispute when the original owner comes to redeem'.…”

Do Kinship Networks Strengthen Private Property? Evidence from RuralChina

“…Consequently, most subcounty socioeconomic regulation and administration were formally delegated to self‐governing groups such as guilds, religious groups, and, especially, kinship networks. Internal lineage regulations on economic transactions were, for example, enforceable in the official court system (Zhang ; Huang ).…”

“…Clogging legal remedies, however, has funneled social unhappiness into "extra-legal" complaint mechanisms, particularly direct petitions to higher-level administrative bodies. The success rate for such petitions is, however, highly unpredictable, and depends heavily on how much trouble the petitioners can credibly threaten government authorities with-for this reason, mass petitions tend to be much more successful than normal individual petitions (Minzner 2006;Zhang 2009). In other words, these petitions are not formalized decision-making processes conducted by state entities, but are rather fluid, opaque, and often highly contentious bargaining processes between adversarial parties.…”

Analisis Hiwalah (Pengalihan Hutang) Dalam Penebusan Pagang Gadai Di Masyarakat Minangkabau

“…Penggadaian tanah adalah penyerahan tanah diiringi dengan penerimaan uang tunai(Aditi, 2020) atau benda barang berharga (Spicksley, 2013) sebagai jaminan atas hutang yang diberikan (Putri & Montessori, 2019) (Hal ini difahami sebagai pemanfaatan lahan tanpa harus memilikinya (Arriola, 2008) Dan hal ini umum dilakukan oleh masyarakat komunal, (Imbua, 2015) khususnya Minangkabau (Nurdin & Tegnan, 2019) dan merupakan tradisi (Yulhendri et al, 2021) untuk menjadikan lahan pertanian sebagai asset transaksi ekonomi. Pagang gadai memiliki waktu yang tidak terbatas (Zhang, 2013) dan kesepakatan akad berakhir apabila pihak yang menggadai menebus barang, benda, lahan yang berada di tangan pihak penerima gadai (wawancara dengan Datuak S, tanggal 15 Maret 2022). Penggunaan waktu yang tidak terbatas menyebabkan pihak penggadai melalaikan tanggung jawabnya dalam penebusan utang, dengan berbagai motif berupa ketidaksanggupan menebus pagang gadai, atau tidak adanya keinginan untuk menebus itu.…”