Social efficiency deficit deciphers social dilemmas

Abstract

What do corruption, resource overexploitation, climate inaction, vaccine hesitancy, traffic congestion, and even cancer metastasis have in common? All these socioeconomic and sociobiological phenomena are known as social dilemmas because they embody in one form or another a fundamental conflict between immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest. A shortcut to the resolution of social dilemmas has thus far been reserved solely for highly stylised cases reducible to dyadic games (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma), whose nature and outcome coalesce in the concept of dilemma strength. We show that a social efficiency deficit, measuring an actor’s potential gain in utility or fitness by switching from an evolutionary equilibrium to a social optimum, generalises dilemma strength irrespective of the underlying social dilemma’s complexity. We progressively build from the simplicity of dyadic games for which the social efficiency deficit and dilemma strength are mathematical duals, to the complexity of carcinogenesis and a vaccination dilemma for which only the social efficiency deficit is numerically calculable. The results send a clear message to policymakers to enact measures that increase the social efficiency deficit until the strain between what is and what could be incentivises society to switch to a more desirable state.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm provides a neurobiological framework for the social decision cascade

“…The participant and co-player were equally rewarded (Reward payoff— R ; $2) if both cooperated; if one player defected but the other cooperated, the betraying player received a reward (Temptation payoff– T ; $3) while the cooperating player received nothing (Sucker’s Payoff– S ; $0). If both chose to defect, both received a diminished reward (Punishment Payoff– P ; $1) [ 34 ].…”

“…The monetary distributions depicted in Fig 1 are organized to conform to the universal scaling parameters for the PDG as an evolutionary dyadic game that promotes cooperation through a number of different reciprocity mechanisms [ 34 – 37 ]. In order to maintain universal dilemma strength in both limited and unlimited well-mixed populations and construct the necessary parametric constraints for the PDG, the gamble-intending dilemma ( D g ’ ) and the risk-averting dilemma ( D r ’ ) must be equal and greater than 0 such that: ( D g ’ = (T-R)/(R-P)) and D r ’ = (P-S)/(R-P)) [ 34 – 37 ]. This generates a Donor & Recipient dilemma template where, given a single decision, defection is incentivized at no cost to the defector; however, given repeated interactions, cooperation is incentivized but at a cost to the cooperator, who risks betrayal and an omission of a reward for the current round [ 38 ].…”

“…A functional task-related blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) scan was acquired with a ZSAGA functional protocol. ZSAGA is a method for reducing the influence of susceptibility artifacts in echo planar imaging [ 34 ]. The number of volumes varied depending on time spent on task (participants spent variable amount of time completing emotional assessment questions); TR = 3,000 ms; TE 1 = 30 ms; TE 2 = 65.8ms; matrix size = 64 x 64mm; FA = 90°; 3.3 x 3.3x 3.3 mm 3 voxels; 30 interleaved slices; FOV = 210 mm.…”

The social cost of contacts: Theory and evidence for the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany

“…The difference in the present values of welfare in the Utilitarian Optimum and in the Nash equilibrium-the latter being 52% of the welfare in the Utilitarian Optimum-can be viewed as a measure of the welfare loss from non-cooperative activities in the Nash equilibrium. It quantifies the social efficiency deficit for the first wave of the pandemic in Germany [56][57][58].…”

“…The relationship is close to linear: An increase in the number of infected leads to a proportional extra welfare loss. The welfare difference between the Utilitarian optimum and the Nash equilibria with purely selfish or imperfectly altruistic individuals, respectively, (i.e., the social efficiency deficit in the terminology of [56][57][58]) is approximately constant, and insensitive to the initial number of infected. The increased reduction in the physical social contacts by altruistic compared to selfish individuals is reflected in a reduction of the social efficiency deficit: imperfect altruism closes about a third of the welfare gap between the Nash equilibrium with selfish individuals, on the one hand, and the Utilitarian optimum, on the other.…”