2018
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.97.012305
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Social dilemmas in multistrategy evolutionary potential games

Abstract: The nature of social dilemmas is studied in n-strategy evolutionary potential games on a square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions and the logit rule. For symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices there are no dilemmas because of the coincidence of individual and common interests. The dilemmas are caused by the antisymmetric parts of the self-and cross-dependent payoff components if it modifies the preferred Nash equilibrium. The contentment of players and the emergence of dilemmas in the preferre… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…For the self-dependent (cross-dependent) games the matrix elements are equivalent in the rows (columns). The antisymmetric part (denoted as A (h) ) of the latter two types of interactions can be defined by (n − 1) parameters and these components are responsible for the appearance of social dilemmas in the potential games [20]. The rest of the dyadic products can also be separated into the sum of symmetric and antisymmetric matrices.…”
Section: Mathematical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For the self-dependent (cross-dependent) games the matrix elements are equivalent in the rows (columns). The antisymmetric part (denoted as A (h) ) of the latter two types of interactions can be defined by (n − 1) parameters and these components are responsible for the appearance of social dilemmas in the potential games [20]. The rest of the dyadic products can also be separated into the sum of symmetric and antisymmetric matrices.…”
Section: Mathematical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For this construction four types of elementary interactions can be distinguished in the game theory, namely, games with self-and cross-dependent payoffs, coordination-type interactions, and combinations of elementary cyclic dominance. The antisymmetric part of the self-and cross-dependent components can cause social dilemmas in the potential games [20] while the presence of cyclic components prohibits the existence of potential. Now we adapt the above mathematical framework to the analyses of directed weighted graphs possessing antisymmetric adjacency matrices (A T = −A).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since then, several areas of knowledge have passed through [3][4][5]. From investigations into social dynamics [6],through spread and control of epidemics [7][8][9] and even linguistics [10,11]. In this way, the theory of complete networks has become a paradigm for interdisciplinary research that, in turn, is a challenge for teaching, production and technical-scientific dissemination.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…O estudo de redes complexas vem perpassando diversas áreas do conhecimento [1][2][3][4]. Desde investigações em dinâmicas sociais [5,6], passando pela propagação e controle de epidemias [7][8][9] e até a linguística [10,11]. Dessa forma, a teoria de redes complexas se tornou um paradigma para pesquisas interdisciplinares que, por sua vez, são um desafio para o ensino, produção e divulgação técnico-científica.…”
Section: Introductionunclassified