2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01561.x
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‘Social Development’ as Neoliberal Trojan Horse: The World Bank and the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia

Abstract: This article seeks to reconceptualize the post‐Washington consensus (PWC) by focusing not simply upon the institutional structures and ideology promoted by it, but the manner in which these are promoted on the ground. The aim is to reveal a central distinction between the Washington consensus and the PWC that has been somewhat neglected: their diverging approaches to implementation. The author focuses on the World Bank‐funded Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia, a project that is viewed by some as… Show more

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Cited by 37 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Scholars trace the concept of social capital as linking the character of various local communities in implementing empowerment and development activities (Field, 2017). Th e argument built is the value of trust in society about social relations (Carroll, 2009), although it must deal with a pattern of clientelism that is rooted in village communities (Haryanto, 2017). In the case of Sumatra, for example, the indigenous village is more meaningful as a cross-linkage of religious leaders who coincidentally share the same profession (Asrinaldi, 2017, p. 57).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Scholars trace the concept of social capital as linking the character of various local communities in implementing empowerment and development activities (Field, 2017). Th e argument built is the value of trust in society about social relations (Carroll, 2009), although it must deal with a pattern of clientelism that is rooted in village communities (Haryanto, 2017). In the case of Sumatra, for example, the indigenous village is more meaningful as a cross-linkage of religious leaders who coincidentally share the same profession (Asrinaldi, 2017, p. 57).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Bangladesh case also hints at how -although not explicitly part of project design -the CCT serves inadvertently to reinvigorate the political economic micro-relations through which impoverishment is reproduced. Today state and development programmes may no longer be the providers of universal services with the result that the authority to select (or not) a particular individual for a programme rests with members of a 'community' (as when project priorities are set by village meetings) (for example, in the Indonesian case discussed in Carroll, 2009). Although research is focusing on how projects are implemented -following them down to the decentralized geographies and heterogeneous social settings -the ways in which social difference is negotiated in relation to community, or how post-colonial intersectional hierarchies inform and influence the negotiations at the local manager-local beneficiary boundary, have yet to be systematically explored.…”
Section: Social Heterogeneity and Post-colonial Differencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…What it did do, however, was address the manner in which these fundamentals were to be delivered and embedded. Importantly, this new social neoliberalism deployed particular political technologies—methods to assist with the embedding of particular projects and programmes (Carroll 2009b, 2010). Specifically, these new technologies included participatory approaches and consultation exercises designed to address implementation impediments.…”
Section: Participatory Development and The Mitigation Of Risk For Capmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Initial consultation exercises conducted for BTC indicate that the project was popular, bringing jobs (albeit temporary ones) for often very poor local communities. Such sentiment is not unusual in highly marginalised situations, with people often interested in any activity that might improve their lot (Carroll 2009b:454). However, how remaining complaints and concerns generated by the project get “managed” seems complicated and unclear, despite the channels of recourse open within domestic jurisdictions, the IFC and EBRD.…”
Section: The Mitigation Of Risk For Others? Impact At Four Scalesmentioning
confidence: 99%