Social Deprivation as Tempting Fate

Abstract

Two recent discussions concerning punishment of the socially deprived reach conflicting conclusions. Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth argue that we should sympathize with the predicament of the poor and therefore mitigate their sentences. Peter Chau disputes von Hirsch and Ashworth's conclusion, contending that having to face strong temptations is not an appropriate ground for reducing anyone's punishment for their crimes. I argue that neither von Hirsch and Ashworth's account nor Chau's critique of it is persuasive. I then take up the challenge of showing why social deprivation renders punishment problematic. I contend that it establishes a perverse incentive structure that is persistent and powerful, requiring the disadvantaged to exercise self-control on an ongoing basis. Repeated acts of self-control are difficult, especially for youths whose skills at it are not yet fully developed. Also, in a variety of more and less subtle ways, social deprivation reduces the incentives for self-control and may work to stunt its development. In closing, I briefly consider the options for responding to the crimes of the chronically disadvantaged.

Anchoring the sentencing scale: A modest proposal

“…In particular, many societies routinely fall short in securing the capabilities of all of their citizens for having decent, autonomous lives. The role that such failures play in precipitating offending is a complex and contentious matter (Lippke, 2011;Murphy, 1973). But supposing that some link between severe social deprivation and crime can be made out, its implications for sentencing might be teased out as follows: if society is partly to blame for criminal offending, then it seems inappropriate to inflict commensurate harms on poor offenders as if they, and they alone, were responsible for the effects of their crimes on victims.…”

Injustice and the right to punish

“…There is a longstanding debate, for example, on whether injustice can furnish a (full or partial) justification or excuse for lawbreaking. See, for example, von Hirsch and Ashworth (), Holroyd (), Lippke (), Green (), Shelby (), and Ewing (). A famous question in this debate is whether having a “rotten social background” should be admitted as a potential defense in criminal trials (Bazelon, ; Delgado, ; Heffernan, ).…”