Social coordination in unknown price-sensitive populations

Brown, Philip N.; Marden, Jason R.

doi:10.1109/cdc.2013.6760040

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 32 publications

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“…In [134,135], the optimal dynamic pricing for players with continuous VOT distributions is investigated, and an algorithm is proposed to compute the optimal tolls that induce a system optimal equilibrium. Under the circumstances where the system designer has incomplete information on players' price sensitivities, an optimal scaled marginal-cost is derived to minimize the POA in congestion games with linear latency [136]. Even though there are fruitful research results on the efficiency improvement of Nash equilibrium, the influence of the pricing on POTA has seldom been studied.…”

Section: Efficiency Analysis Of Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Existence, convergence and efficiency analysis of nash equilibrium and its applications

Wang¹

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Game theory deals with strategic interactions among multiple players, where each player tries to maximize/minimize its utility/cost. It has been applied in a broad array of areas such as economics, transportation, engineering, psychology, etc. Nash equilibrium, a fundamental concept in the realm of noncooperative game theory, is defined as the action profile of all players where none of the players can improve its utility/cost by a unilateral move. However, it is widely known that a Nash equilibrium often exhibits a suboptimal behavior compared with the socially optimal assignment. Moreover, in repeated games where each player makes its decision based on the available information at each stage, it is possible that the action profiles of all players fail to converge to a Nash equilibrium. This thesis presents research results on existence, convergence and efficiency analysis of Nash equilibrium in variety classes of games and their applications. First, we discuss a repeated noncooperative multiple choices congestion game in which players have limited information about each other and make their decisions simultaneously. Congestion games are a class of games in game theory, in which the utility of each player depends on the resources each player chooses and the number of players choosing the same resource. At each stage, players can calculate their best choice if they know the number of players choosing each resource. However, in most cases, each player does not know other players' strategies before it makes its decision. Therefore, a player may need to estimate the number of players choosing each resource. We introduce a consensus protocol to estimate the percentage of players selecting each resource. At each stage, each player may exchange information with

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Section: Efficiency Analysis Of Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Existence, convergence and efficiency analysis of nash equilibrium and its applications

Wang¹

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Controlling human utilization of shared resources via taxes

Hota¹,

Sundaram²

2016

2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate.1 The probability weighting function captures the transformation of true probabilities into perceived probabilities by humans. We do not consider the impact of probability weighting in this work.2 However, there are instances where authorities have shut down large online platforms that encourage illegal activities [23], [24]. This is captured by resource failure in our setting.

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The Robustness of Marginal-Cost Taxes in Affine Congestion Games

Brown

Marden

2017

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

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Social coordination in unknown price-sensitive populations

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Existence, convergence and efficiency analysis of nash equilibrium and its applications

Existence, convergence and efficiency analysis of nash equilibrium and its applications

Controlling human utilization of shared resources via taxes

The Robustness of Marginal-Cost Taxes in Affine Congestion Games

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