2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.023
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Social comparison nudges—Guessing the norm increases charitable giving

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 45 publications
(32 citation statements)
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“…7, pp. 2801-2819, © 2019 taxpayers do, and this social comparison could also increase compliance by appealing to a desire to conform to the social norm that tax compliance is socially considered as appropriate behavior (Cullis and Lewis 1997, Wenzel 2004, Bartke et al 2017. In this respect, the Fairness treatment may affect tax compliance through both a focusing effect, by drawing taxpayers' attention to the norm, and an information effect, by making taxpayers aware of how many others follow the norm (Krupka and Weber 2009).…”
Section: Main Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7, pp. 2801-2819, © 2019 taxpayers do, and this social comparison could also increase compliance by appealing to a desire to conform to the social norm that tax compliance is socially considered as appropriate behavior (Cullis and Lewis 1997, Wenzel 2004, Bartke et al 2017. In this respect, the Fairness treatment may affect tax compliance through both a focusing effect, by drawing taxpayers' attention to the norm, and an information effect, by making taxpayers aware of how many others follow the norm (Krupka and Weber 2009).…”
Section: Main Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We demonstrate this indirect effect on donation likelihood (Study 4.1), willingness, and behavior (both Study 4.2). Descriptive norms have previously been shown to influence a range of socially desirable behavior, including charitable giving (Agerström et al, 2016;Bartke et al, 2017;Croson et al, 2009;McDonald et al, 2013;Nolan et al, 2008). The current study confirms and extends that evidence base by demonstrating that the perceived norms of group members themselves can be influenced by institutional signals (i.e., government policy and leader rhetoric) and can explain observed instances of crowding in.…”
Section: Crowding In and Crowding Out: Support For The Norm Divergencsupporting
confidence: 83%
“…Social norms provide cues to group members about what is expected in a given context (e.g., Cialdini et al, 1990). Perceptions of group norms can influence a range of socially desirable attitudes and behaviors (Jacobson, Jacobson, & Hood, 2015;Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000;McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013;Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008;Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993;Terry & Hogg, 1996)-including charitable giving (Agerström, Carlsson, Nicklasson, & Guntell, 2016;Bartke, Friedl, Gelhaar, & Reh, 2017;Croson et al, 2009; J. R. Smith & McSweeney, 2007). We propose that government policies may influence perceptions of national group norms, which in turn affect private giving.…”
Section: Perceived Group Norms Affect Attitudes and Behaviormentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The impact of social norms can be reinforced through social control and social comparisons (e.g. Bartke, Friedl, Gelhaar, & Reh, 2017), including role models (Bandura & Walters, 1969). Striving for conformity with external social expectations, and consistency with internalised norms, can limit people's self-interest (bounded selfinterest; e.g.…”
Section: Problem Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%