Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates

Abstract

Why are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? The literature provides few clear answers, as some scholars focus on institutional factors, whereas others emphasize amendment culture. We bridge this divide with new theoretical and empirical insights. Using data from democratic constitutions worldwide and U.S. state constitutions, we examine how social capital reduces the transaction costs imposed by amendment rules. The results indicate that constitutional rigidity decreases amendment frequency, but group membership, civic activism, and political trust can offset the effect of amendment rules. Our findings have important implications for scholars in public law, constitutional and democratic theory, and social movements.

The political process in nations: Civil society participation and income inequality

“…As citizens engage in activities that transcend their immediate social circles, they encounter individuals from different backgrounds, forging new connections across diverse communities. This interaction enables the exchange of ideas, resources, and information, ultimately contributing to the development of broader social networks and increased social cohesion (Blake et al, 2023).…”