Social Benefit versus Technological Risk

Starr, Chauncey

doi:10.1126/science.165.3899.1232

Cited by 1,482 publications

(621 citation statements)

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“…The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003;Sunstein, 2005).…”

Section: Three Models Of Risk Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment

et al. 2012

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We conducted a two-nation study (United States, n = 1500; England, n = 1500) to test a novel theory of science communication. The cultural cognition thesis posits that individuals make extensive reliance on cultural meanings in forming perceptions of risk. The logic of the cultural cognition thesis suggests the potential value of a distinctive two-channel science communication strategy that combines information content ("Channel 1") with cultural meanings ("Channel 2") selected to promote openminded assessment of information across diverse communities. In the study, scientific information content on climate change was held constant while the cultural meaning of that information was experimentally manipulated. Consistent with the study hypotheses, we found that making citizens aware of the potential contribution of geoengineering as a supplement to restriction of CO2 emissions helps to offset cultural polarization over the validity of climate-change science. We also tested the hypothesis, derived from competing models of science communication, that exposure to information on geoengineering would provoke discounting of climate-change risks generally. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that subjects exposed to information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned about climate change risks than those assigned to a control condition.

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Section: Three Models Of Risk Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment

et al. 2012

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“…A large body of research suggests that peoples' willingness to accept technological risk is governed by factors related not only to the actual risk but also to other characteristics (Sjöberg, 2000;Slovic and Peters, 2006;Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey, 2014). For example, risks are more acceptable when they are voluntary (which it may not be for the many road users who will have to share the road with HAVs) and if a person can exert control over the outcomes (which is, by definition, not the case for higher levels of vehicle automation) (Starr, 1969;Fischhoff et al, 1978;Otway and von Winterfeldt, 1982;Slovic, 1987Slovic, , 2000Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Enemy of Good: Estimating the Cost of Waiting for Nearly Perfect Automated Vehicles

Kalra¹,

Groves²

2017

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This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2150Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN: 978-0-8330-9937-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark. Cover image: AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar iii PrefaceThe RAND Corporation has a long history of research on intelligent systems. Since the 1950s, with work on chess-playing computers and the Logic Theory Machine, RAND has produced objective, evidence-based research to help inform how society can harness the benefits and manage the risks of intelligent, transformative technologies. RAND's work on autonomous and automated vehicles builds on this firm foundation. RAND Science, Technology, and PolicyThis research was conducted in the RAND Science, Technology, and Policy program, which focuses primarily on the role of scientific development and technological innovation in human behavior, global and regional decisionmaking as it relates to science and technology, and the concurrent effects that science and technology have on policy analysis and policy choices.This program is part of RAND Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment, a division of the RAND Corporation dedicated to improving policy-and decisionmaking in a wide range of policy domains, including civil and criminal justice, infrastructure development and financing, environmental policy, transportation planning and techiv The Enemy of Good: Estimating the Cost of Waiting for Nearly Perfect Automated Vehicles nology, immigration and border protection, public and occupational safety, energy policy, science and innovation policy, space, and telecommunications.During the development of this report and at the time of publication, co-author Nidhi Kalra's spouse served as co-founder and president of Nuro, a machine-learning and robotics start-up company engaged in autonomous vehicle development. He previously served as a principal engineer for Google's driverless car proje...

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“…This is despite the observation made over 30 years ago that the general population views a risk situation differently to those who are at risk (Starr, 1969) and the more recent acknowledgement that it is futile to generalise from attitudes of those that are healthy to those whose imminent survival depends on surgery (Radley, 1996).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Double or quits’: perceptions and management of organ transplantation by adults with cystic fibrosis

Lowton

2003

Social Science & Medicine

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Social Benefit versus Technological Risk

Cited by 1,482 publications

References 0 publications

Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment

Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment

The Enemy of Good: Estimating the Cost of Waiting for Nearly Perfect Automated Vehicles

‘Double or quits’: perceptions and management of organ transplantation by adults with cystic fibrosis

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