Small States in World Markets

Katzenstein, Peter J.

doi:10.7591/9781501700361

Cited by 221 publications

(90 citation statements)

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“…Building on Katzenstein (1985), Crouch (1993) and Thelen (2004), we have argued elsewhere (Cusack et al, 2007(Cusack et al, , 2010) that the explanation for the linkage between economic and political systems, and hence also types of welfare states, is likely to be that PR promotes the legislative representation of economic agents who have made significant investments in each other, in co-specific assets. Such representation facilitates compromise over regulatory policies in which there is a strong element of common interest, especially through a specialized committee system.…”

Section: The Origins Of the Three Worldsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Politics for markets

Iversen

Soskice

2015

Journal of European Social Policy

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We argue that the welfare state operates very differently in the advanced sectors of modern economies and in the low-skill sectors. Governments are concerned to promote the advanced sectors of their economies in which they have comparative advantage. This is a valence issue not a partisan one. Where companies and employees in advanced sectors co-invest heavily in company-specific skills, then governments will be concerned to maintain insurance infrastructures to underwrite these investments. Hence, in advanced sectors, we see politics for markets in maintaining insurance-based welfare states. In low-skill sectors, redistribution and active labour market policies are partisan issues for legislatures, so here our analysis is in line with Politics against Markets. Effective welfare state policies depend on political coalitions in which the low-skilled are represented. We suggest that those coalitions may be less available just as low-skilled workers are increasingly excluded from post-Fordist collective bargaining coverage.

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Section: The Origins Of the Three Worldsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Politics for markets

Iversen

Soskice

2015

Journal of European Social Policy

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“…Both countries have small populations, a factor that influences their politics and policy formation process (Katzenstein 1985). Both have a long welfare tradition and can be regarded as strong welfare states in which social policies have had considerable influence on social structures.…”

Section: Sweden and Austria -Institutional Commonalities And Differencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Education and Childlessness: The Influence of Educational Field and Educational Level on Childlessness among Swedish and Austrian Women

Neyer

Hoem

Andersson

2017

Demographic Research Monographs

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“…10 Executive lobbying refers to attempts made by corporate executives to 'personally' contact political decision makers (Skippari 2005). Skippari (2005) notes that the executive lobbying strategy can be more commonly observed in some countries (mainly traditional settings), in which 'personal connections between business executives and politicians' have been traditionally close (Katzenstein 1985;Murtha and Lenway 1994). 11 We acknowledge that differentiating political parties' projects and politicians' personal projects is not straightforward in a family-led political context.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, Traditionalism and Politics: A Story from a Traditional Setting

2016

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This paper demonstrates the political perspective of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures and, drawing on Weber's notion of traditionalism, seeks to explain what motivates companies to make such disclosures in a traditional setting. Annual reports of 23 banking companies in Bangladesh are analysed over the period [2009][2010][2011][2012]. This is supplemented by a review of documentary evidence on the political and social activities of corporations and reports published in national and international newspapers. We found that, in the banking companies over the period of study, apparently neutral, corporate, philanthropic activities disclosed and promoted in CSR reports are inextricably linked to powerful leaders' personal projects and the ruling party's agendas. We have demonstrated elements of traditional societies, including personal loyalty and the public display of loyalty, the master-servant relationship, and obedience to personal rather than formal authority, provide an understanding of why banks (with or without explicit political linkages with the ruling party) have employed politically charged CSR disclosure strategies. The paper contributes to disclosure studies where political motivations of corporate disclosure rarely discussed. The paper extends the debate on political CSR by demonstrating that the role of family and familial values at the organisational and national levels may be much more important when it comes to CSR disclosure and activities.

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Small States in World Markets

Cited by 221 publications

References 0 publications

Politics for markets

Politics for markets

Education and Childlessness: The Influence of Educational Field and Educational Level on Childlessness among Swedish and Austrian Women

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, Traditionalism and Politics: A Story from a Traditional Setting

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