Small amounts for big bangs? Rethinking responses to “low cost” terrorism

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to challenge the “myth” that terrorism is cheap and that terrorists are extremely efficient in how they use their money.Design/methodology/approachThis paper makes a critical assessment of the “costs” involved in terrorist attacks and addresses the debate about how this affects the overall strategy against terrorist financing.FindingsThis paper argues that costs of terrorism are many and not limited to what is spent on an actual attack. Owing to military and financial counter‐measures, terrorists appear to have lost overall operational efficiency; they are no longer capable of carrying out large‐scale and complex operations like the September 2001 attacks.Originality/valueSmall amounts involved in carrying out a terrorist attack have led to the perception that terrorism is cheap and terrorist attacks can be inexpensively implemented. This has undermined the global and national efforts to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT). This paper is an attempt to persuade the stakeholders in the CFT community that targeting terrorist financing has been and must remain one of the most important fronts in the war against terrorism.

Consequences of Assessments of Effectiveness for Counterterrorist Financing Policy

“…Other prominent attacks, such as those in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, probably cost less than US$10,000 (U.K. Home Office, 2006;United Nations, 2004). Much more expensive is the maintenance of a large organization committing terrorist acts or a major network of such organizations over a longer period of time, such as al-Quaida (Acharya, 2009;Haigner, Schneider, & Wakolbinger, 2012). Financing needs, as well as funding activities, of those committing terrorist acts vary greatly.…”

Understanding the costing decisions behind terror attacks – an analytical study

“…There are two different schools of thought currently expounding their respective theories on two different concepts. The first one relates to the phenomenon of low cost terrorism itself, where one set of literature depicting low cost terrorism as a new phenomenon or a paradigm (Strebel, 2010;Whitlock, 2008) and an opposing literary collection which debunks the notion of low cost terrorism (Prober, 2005;Acharya, 2009). Strebel (2010) and Whitlock (2008) argue that terrorism has become an inexpensive affair which in turn renders the interdicting mechanisms of law enforcement agencies ineffective.…”

“…Strebel (2010) and Whitlock (2008) argue that terrorism has become an inexpensive affair which in turn renders the interdicting mechanisms of law enforcement agencies ineffective. On the other hand, Prober (2005) and Acharya (2009) argue that, notwithstanding the cheap costs of terror attacks (operational cost), the other costs associated with training, infrastructure, subsistence (collectively known as organisational cost) are invariably high. This argument is supported by theories that argue that the terror groups apportion higher budget levels for organisational cost compared to operational cost (Brissard, 2003) [2].…”

“…On the other hand, another literary collection contend that it is as a result of resource constraints experienced by terror groups, which prevent them from mounting large operations like 9/11, due to the targeted restrictions placed on the global financial systems (Tupman, 2009;Acharya, 2009;Levitt, 2008). The war on combating financing of terrorism (CFT) post 9/11 has to some extent degraded the financial strengths of transnational terror groups like "Al Qaeda" and "Lashkar e Toiba" (LeT), thereby, limiting their ability but, however, has not been effective against homegrown groups.…”

“…It, however, does not include other cost components such as infrastructure, subsistence, etc. On the other hand, opposing literature collection (Prober, 2005;Acharya, 2009) argues that "low cost terrorism" is a fallacious myth. They argue that the cost components of terror attacks, namely, operational cost (cost associated with terror attacks) and the organisational costs (costs associated with infrastructure, subsistence, etc) are low and high, respectively.…”