2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-58469-0_2
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Slow TCAM Exhaustion DDoS Attack

Abstract: Software Defined Networks (SDN) facilitate network management by decoupling the data plane which forwards packets using efficient switches from the control plane by leaving the decisions on how packets should be forwarded to a (centralized) controller. However, due to limitations on the number of forwarding rules a switch can store in its TCAM memory, SDN networks have been subject to saturation and TCAM exhaustion attacks where the attacker is able to deny service by forcing a target switch to install a great… Show more

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Cited by 56 publications
(44 citation statements)
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“…As the current flow rules are preserved, this dramatically increases the number of flow rules in the switch. Consequently, not only the server becomes the victim of a stealthy DoS attack, but also the SDN control and data plane components suffer from resource exhaustion [4], [5]. Normally, in case of stealthy DoS attacks the number of flow rules do not exceed the flowtable capacity in the SDN switches.…”
Section: B Vulnerabilities In Software Defined Network Wrt Stealmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As the current flow rules are preserved, this dramatically increases the number of flow rules in the switch. Consequently, not only the server becomes the victim of a stealthy DoS attack, but also the SDN control and data plane components suffer from resource exhaustion [4], [5]. Normally, in case of stealthy DoS attacks the number of flow rules do not exceed the flowtable capacity in the SDN switches.…”
Section: B Vulnerabilities In Software Defined Network Wrt Stealmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1. For example, SDN-based forwarding devices, i.e., OpenFlow switches [3], can suffer from overflow problems caused by a silent saturation DoS attack [2], [4], [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We observe that the switch starts getting overflowed or cannot handle new flow rules if the current total number of flows is around 3000 ( f cap i ) [6], [8]. Setting the idle_timeout value (after which the flow entries are removed) to 10 seconds, the safety threshold for the packet rate the switch can handle is 300 packets per second assuming that each packet belongs to a different traffic flow rule (worst case assumption).…”
Section: B Training Q-learning and Svm Algorithmsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to show the performance enhancement in traffic flow monitoring in SDN based networks with the Q-DATA framework, we implement a SOM-based IDS application (Self Organizing Map algorithm [21]) to detect abnormal traffic on top of the ONOS controller. We consider some common attacks, which can make the SDN switch become overflowed, comprising TCP SYN flood [22], Port scanning [22], Low and Slow Denial-of-Service [6]. The attack traffic is stemmed from hosts and it is directed to Web servers in our setup.…”
Section: Experiments Setupmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A widely discussed attack on the SDN data plane is via exhaustion of the TCAM memory in hardware SDN switches [165,166]. In contrast, we consider the exhausting of computing resources in a software SDN switch and the resulting impact on its ability to forward legitimate packets.…”
Section: Attack On the Data Planementioning
confidence: 99%