Skepticism about Moral Responsibility

Rosen, Gideon

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00030.x

Cited by 176 publications

(130 citation statements)

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“…8 There are a range of different views about what it takes to non-culpably have a false belief which excuses a norm-violating action. Rosen (2003) suggests that a false belief is non-culpable only if it doesn't stem from an earlier knowing violation of epistemic norms. But examples from Moody-Adams (1994) and Fitzpatrick (2008) show that Rosen's requirement is too strong.…”

Section: Non-culpable Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blame and Wrongdoing

Brown¹

2017

Episteme

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The idea that one can blamelessly violate a norm is central to ethics and epistemology. The paper examines the prospects for an account of blameless norm violation applicable both to norms governing action and norms governing belief. In doing so, I remain neutral on just what are the norms governing action and belief. I examine three leading suggestions for understanding blameless violation of a norm which is not overridden by another norm: (1) doxastic accounts; (2) epistemic accounts; and (3) appeal to expected value. We see that all of these accounts face problems when understood as accounts of blameless norm violation applicable to both belief and action. This leaves a variety of options including (1) seeking an alternative account of blameless norm violation common to belief and action; (2) concluding that we cannot determine the correct account of blameless norm violation independently of what are the norms of belief; and (3) abandoning the project of nding a common account of blameless norm violation common to ethics and epistemology.

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Section: Non-culpable Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blame and Wrongdoing

Brown¹

2017

Episteme

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“…even if we think that any agent would reject these beliefs after examining them sincerely, we can imagine that George has never examined his beliefs because he has never had any evidence that they ought to be examined. Rosen (2004) argues that this phenomenon-in which agents reasonably hold unreasonable beliefs because they have never had reason to examine them-is common. For present purposes, it is sufficient that this phenomenon be possible.…”

Section: Which Features Are Wrong-making?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychopaths, Ill-Will, and the Wrong-Making Features of Actions

Clancy¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Many recent discussions of psychopaths have centered on the question of whether they can express ill-will when they act, a capacity which is generally taken to be required for moral blameworthiness. However, the debate over ill-will currently stands at an impasse; the participants are in substantial agreement as to which attitudes psychopaths can express, but disagree as to which attitudes count as ill-will. I argue that this impasse reflects an underlying, implicit disagreement as to which features of actions are wrong-making. By uncovering this implicit disagreement and addressing it head-on, we should be able to break the impasse. IntroductionAre psychopaths morally blameworthy for their bad actions? Many recent treatments of this question have focused on psychopaths' capacity, or lack thereof, to express ill-will by acting. Psychopaths apparently understand that others can be harmed, and thus their actions can express the judgment that the harm they inflict on others is unimportant. But psychopaths apparently do not understand that others have moral standing, and thus their actions cannot express contempt for other persons qua moral patients. While the parties to the ill-will debate agree as to which attitudes psychopaths can express, they disagree as to which attitudes count as ill-will. The debate seems to have reached an impasse.I argue here that this impasse is due in large part to an implicit disagreement as to which features of actions are wrong-making. Ill-will is best understood, I contend, as an objectionable attitude towards one or more of the features of actions which make them wrong. As I hope to show, the question of precisely which features make actions wrong is more difficult than has previously been appreciated. even when a given set of normative assumptions is shared, it is This, I contend, is a major cause of the disagreement over the ill-will question. The expression of ill-will requires awareness of the wrong-making features, and psychopaths are aware of some features but not others. Some parties implicitly identify the wrong-making features as those of which the psychopath is aware-such as the harmfulness of his actions-and conclude that he does express ill-will. Others implicitly identify the wrong-making features as those of which the psychopath is not aware-such as the fact that he harms persons with moral standing-and conclude that he does not express ill-will. This underlying disagreement explains why the ill-will question has reached its current impasse; exposing the disagreement reveals a way in which the impasse can be broken.In Section 2, I provide an overview of the ill-will question and the surrounding impasse. In Section 3, I offer my diagnosis-our disagreement about whether psychopaths can express ill-will reflects an underlying disagreement as to which features of actions are wrong-making. In Section 4, I discuss the prospects for resolving this underlying disagreement and breaking the impasse. Psychopaths and Ill-WillThe empirical details of psychopathy are the subject of ...

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“…Philosophers such as Zimmerman (1997) and Rosen (2004) endorse the awareness condition and so they cannot say that George (and comparable lazy agents of the second type) can be blameworthy.…”

Section: (P1)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence One Does Not Possess

Wieland¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Unpossessed evidence abounds. There is much to be seen and much to be had. much of it will never have an impact on our epistemic standings, but some of it does. Some evidence is such that we are blameworthy for not having it, and there is a tricky question about how to delineate this class of evidence. in this paper, i address and propose a solution to the dilemma posed by lazy agents on the one hand and agents facing exceptional evidence on the other. One familiar suggestion is that agents are blameworthy when their conduct results from their vices, and i will make a proposal that further analyses such vices in terms of exceptionality facts.

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Skepticism about Moral Responsibility

Cited by 176 publications

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Blame and Wrongdoing

Blame and Wrongdoing

Psychopaths, Ill-Will, and the Wrong-Making Features of Actions

Evidence One Does Not Possess

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