Skeptical theism, moral skepticism, and epistemic propriety

Rutledge, Jonathan C.

doi:10.1007/s11153-016-9567-0

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…(ST) No human being is justified (or warranted, or reasonable) in thinking the following about any evil e that has ever occurred: there is (or is probably) no reason that could justify God in permitting e. (Rea 2013, 483) A common critique of skeptical theism attempts to demonstrate that while (ST) may seem initially plausible, accepting it would commit us to more general and unwelcome forms of moral skepticism (Sehon 2010;Bergmann 2011, 386ff;Rea 2013;Maitzen 2013;Rutledge 2017). Of particular interest in the current context is an exchange between Stephen Maitzen and Michael Rea about one kind of moral skepticism.…”

Section: (Sc4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

Panchuk¹

2021

JAT

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This paper demonstrates that the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of evil deprives the analytic theologian of theoretical resources necessary to avoid accepting as veridical merely apparent divine commands that endorse cruelty. In particular, I argue that the same skeptical considerations that lead analytic theologians to endorse skeptical theism also lead to what I call “divine command skepticism”—an inability to make certain kinds of judgements about what a good God would or would not command. The danger of divine command skepticism is not that it generates new reasons to think that God has commanded horrors, but, rather, that it undercuts the defeaters we might otherwise have for thinking that God has commanded those horrors. It does so both by rendering illicit certain theological and hermeneutical methodologies employed within liberatory frameworks (i.e., various kinds of liberation theologies) and by depriving the theologian of some of the more “traditional” mechanisms for resolving such apparent conflicts.

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Section: (Sc4)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

Panchuk¹

2021

JAT

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“…Particularly, the evidential argument from evil, which states that we have evidence against the existence of God through evil, conducts to a skeptical position not only about our knowledge of God, but about the reality of the object of that knowledge. In the words of Rutledge (2017), ST holds: "ST: We have no good reason for thinking that the goods, evils and entailment relations between them of which we are aware are representative of the goods, evils, and entailment relations between them that there are. " (p. 263) In other words, the fallibility and finitude of our knowledge would not allow us an access to the foundation of what is good and evil.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For Rutledge (2017), the central point is that MP is a consequence of MS, attending the criterion all things considered:…”

Section: IVmentioning

confidence: 99%

Skeptical Theism, Free Will Skepticism and Atheism: Pondering the Scope of Moral Paralysis

Rojas

2019

Cueteo

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Teísmo escéptico, escepticismo sobre el libre albedrío y ateísmo: consideración sobre el alcance de la parálisis moral Teísmo cético, ceticismo do livre alvedrio e ateísmo: pensar os alcances da paralisia moral Rafael Miranda-Rojas 2 1 This paper was written thanks to the important support from CONICYT FONDECYT N° 11180422, and Post doctoral scholarship BECAS CHILE N° 74190016. I appreciate the comments from an anonymous referee.

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God and gratuitous evil: Between the rock and the hard place

Oliveira

2023

Int J Philos Relig

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To most of us -believers and non-believers alike -the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn't hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God's existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I'm right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see.

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Skeptical theism, moral skepticism, and epistemic propriety

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics

Skeptical Theism, Free Will Skepticism and Atheism: Pondering the Scope of Moral Paralysis

God and gratuitous evil: Between the rock and the hard place

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