Skeptical theism and the problem of moral aporia

Piper, Mark

doi:10.1007/s11153-007-9128-7

Cited by 19 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…ST leaves us unable to distinguish between good and evil at all (Hasker 2010, 22). Mark Piper and Scott Sehon argue along similar lines, demonstrating ST leaves us in a position of moral paralysis (Piper 2007;Sehon 2010).…”

Section: Skeptical Theism Does Not Resolve Pogmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Matthew 5:45 is vague and whether Jesus intends to discuss the sufferings that may befall various peoples is unclear. Similar interpretive problems occur for allowing evil, Mark Piper writes, "[t]he benefit in question must either go primarily to the sufferer of evil, or the sufferer of evil must eventually be compensated for the evil in some way" (Piper 2007, 70); based on a footnote in (Piper, 2007), Eleanore Stump (apparently) agrees and adds additional criteria which Piper leaves out due to its controversial nature. 10.…”

Section: Daniel Linford and William R Pattersonmentioning

confidence: 99%

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God, Geography, and Justice

Linford

Patterson

2016

EPH

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The existence of various sufferings has long been thought to pose a problem for the existence of a personal God: the Problem of Evil (POE). In this paper, we propose an original version of POE, in which the geographic distribution of sufferings and of opportunities for flourishing or suffering is better explained if the universe, at bottom, is indifferent to the human condition than if, as theists propose, there is a personal God from whom the universe originates: the Problem of Geography (POG). POG moves beyond previous versions of POE because traditional responses to POE (skeptical theism and various theodicies) are less effective as responses to POG than they are to other versions of POE.

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Section: Skeptical Theism Does Not Resolve Pogmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Daniel Linford and William R Pattersonmentioning

confidence: 99%

God, Geography, and Justice

Linford

Patterson

2016

EPH

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“…11.Mark Piper has also noted the distinction between stronger and weaker forms of sceptical theism in Piper (2008). For another argument on the effect of ST on practical decision-making, also see Piper (2007). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism

Rancourt¹

2012

Rel. Stud.

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Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in our decision-making. The first horn undermines theism, while the second undermines our moral decision-making. Thus, sceptical theism is problematic.Religious Studies (2013) 49, 313-325

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“…Without a doubt, the most serious and widespread criticism of skeptical theism is that it is somehow at odds with either moral deliberation (Fales 1992; Russell 1996; Almeida and Oppy 2003, 2004; Hasker 2004; Pereboom 2004, 2005; Piper 2007; Maitzen 2009) or moral knowledge (Wachterhauser 1985; Russell 1996; Trakakis 2003; Jordan 2006; Schnall 2007). If we are never in a position to tell whether God has a reason for allowing a particular prima facie evil or not, then we are never in a position to tell whether we should allow a particular prima facie evil or not.…”

Section: 8 Inconsistent With Moral Deliberation/moral Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Skeptical Theism

McBrayer

2010

Philosophy Compass

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Most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God take the following form: If God exists, the world would not be like this (where ‘this’ picks out some feature of the world like the existence of evil, etc.) But the world is like this. Therefore, God does not exist. Skeptical theists are theists who are skeptical of our ability to make judgments of the sort expressed by premise (1). According to skeptical theism, if there were a God, it is likely that he would have reasons for acting that are beyond our ken, and thus we are not justified in making all‐things‐considered judgments about what the world would be like if there were a God. In particular, the fact that we don’t see a good reason for X does not justify the conclusion that there is no good reason for X.1 Thus, skeptical theism purports to undercut most a posteriori arguments against the existence of God. What follows is an account of the nature of skeptical theism, an application of skeptical theism to both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness, and a review of the cases for and against skeptical theism.

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Skeptical theism and the problem of moral aporia

Cited by 19 publications

References 5 publications

God, Geography, and Justice

God, Geography, and Justice

Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism

Skeptical Theism

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