2002
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.303505
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Size Really Matters: Further Evidence on the Negative Relationship Between Board Size and Firm Value

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Cited by 129 publications
(134 citation statements)
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“…These anti-larger board views were empirically supported by a number of prior studies mainly in the corporate performance literature (e.g. Mak and Kusnadi, 2005).…”
Section: Icd and Corporate Governancesupporting
confidence: 56%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…These anti-larger board views were empirically supported by a number of prior studies mainly in the corporate performance literature (e.g. Mak and Kusnadi, 2005).…”
Section: Icd and Corporate Governancesupporting
confidence: 56%
“…Many studies were conducted to investigate the impact of board size on various organizational multitudes such as strategic management (Goodstein et al, 1994); corporate performance (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005;Coles et al, 2008); and ICDs (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007;Abeysekera, 2010;Hidalgo et al, 2011;Abdul Rashid et al, 2012). The extant literature documents both arguments for (e.g.…”
Section: Icd and Corporate Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our conjecture for the reason why these firms exhibit different relationship curves is perhaps the factor of size synergy. The size of top management team (TMT) has an impact on organizational decisions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993;Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). Because operational complexity varies with size, the decision-making strategy also varies; consequently, the impact on firm performance also differs.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…MAK and KUSANDI (2002) find that firm size positively affects firm value. This is done to ensure that the relations found between firm value metrics and corporate governance mechanisms are not due to omitted variables.…”
Section: Control Variablesmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…In contrast, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that higher managerial ownership reduces the offer price-to-book and/or the initial return. Consistently, MAK and KUSANDI (2002) examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms of Singapore and Malaysian firms on their Tobin's Q. SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1986) argue that blockholder ownership increases efficiency as holders of large blocks have more incentive to effectively monitor managers.…”
Section: Hypothesis 5: a Positive (Or Negative) Relationship Between mentioning
confidence: 99%