Size, Power, and Electoral Systems: Exogenous Determinants of Legislative Procedural Choice

Abstract

I tested hypotheses about the relationship between exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a unique cross‐sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55 legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote.

Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison

“…In addition, we control for whether the parliament can remove the executive and whether the parliament is bicameral. In terms of coverage our analysis comes very close to Taylor's (2006) study, as there are only 19 non-European parliamentary chambers among the 55 chambers he considers. Yet with our 44 chambers that we can use in our analysis, our coverage is slightly broader than his.…”

“…lower thresholds for passing a proposal) in order that vote trades can be sustained. Similarly, in a more general analysis explaining how exogenous institutions affect parliamentary procedures, Taylor (2006) finds that rank-andfile members have less procedural rights in large parliaments. He suggests, therefore, that MPs in large parliaments are willing to accept centralised procedures, because such arrangements 'prevent gridlock and cut the costs of forging cooperation' (Taylor 2006: 338).…”

“…Finally, drawing in part on Carrubba and Volden (2000) and Taylor (2006), we also expect that the size of parliament plays a role in the choice of rules. Carrubba and Volden (2000) develop a logrolling game in which legislators repeatedly vote over sets of distributive bills.…”

“…Based on a formal model, Carrubba and Volden (2000) come to the conclusion that larger chambers will have more restrictive rules (see also the discussion by Taylor 2006: 328). Furthermore, Carroll et al (2006) offer an explanation of what might explain the attribution of important offices in parliaments (what they label 'mega-seats') and Taylor (2006) provides a more general assessment of what explains the more or less centralised character of the procedures parliaments rely on. Also, drawing on rational choice institutionalism, Sieberer et al (2011) argue that rule changes are either adopted because they offer advantages for at least a subset of actors (most likely parties controlling a majority in parliament) or because they promise efficiency gains.…”

“…13 The size of parliamentary chambers comes from the same source. Following in part Taylor (2006), we will also use some control variables in our analysis. First, we consider whether a legislature can remove the executive (a measure coming from Regan et al 2009 'Institutions and Elections Project') and second, we take into account whether a country has a bicameral parliament (this information is gleaned from Johnson and Wallack 2006).…”