1972
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-6538-1
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Sinn und Inhalt in der Genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls

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“…47 The experience that is at issue in the question whether or not the presentation of a temporally distributed object is itself temporally distributed is an experience based on internal perception. This answer is that, in his analysis of the possibility of the perception of time, Meinong relies on a priori considerations.…”
Section: Husserl's Analysis Of Time-consciousness Inmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…47 The experience that is at issue in the question whether or not the presentation of a temporally distributed object is itself temporally distributed is an experience based on internal perception. This answer is that, in his analysis of the possibility of the perception of time, Meinong relies on a priori considerations.…”
Section: Husserl's Analysis Of Time-consciousness Inmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…47 sciousness itself is an intuitive modification, then it no longer requires fadings in the sense in which they have been discussed in this model, namely as real core data, in order to explain the intuitive content of retention. ends his considerations in "Appendix II" to interpret time-consciousness in analogy with image-consciousness with the conclusion that retentional consciousness cannot be considered as an empty modification.…”
Section: Chapfer4mentioning
confidence: 99%
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