Sinking in: the peripheral Baldwinisation of human cognition

Abstract

The Baldwin effect is a hypothetical process in which a learned response to environmental change evolves a genetic basis. Modelling has shown that the Baldwin effect offers a plausible, elegant explanation for the emergence of complex behavioural traits but there is little direct empirical evidence of its occurrence. Here we highlight experimental evidence of the Baldwin effect and argue that it acts preferentially on peripheral rather than central cognitive processes. Careful scrutiny of research on taste aversion and fear learning, language and imitation, indicates that their efficiency depends on adaptively specialised input and output processes – analogues of scanner and printer interfaces that feed information to core inference processes and structure their behavioural expression.

The cultural evolution of cultural evolution

“…We do not assume that specialized cognitive mechanisms such as imitation have been genetically assimilated to any substantial degree. This is because we think the present-day evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience points towards these mechanisms being culturally inherited now (Supplement 3, [33]). To the extent that this is plausible, it is important to have viable evolutionary hypotheses that do not rely on genetic assimilation.…”

Imitation and culture: What gives?

“…Do our capacities for imitation, theory of mind and other complex cognitive processes have nothing to do with our outstanding diversity (Culture 2 ) and propensity to improve socially learned behaviour over generations (Culture 3 )? That seems very unlikely, but an alternative solution to the puzzle is emerging: Recent research on the childhood development of imitation, theory of mind, and other complex cognitive processes suggests that—like beliefs, preferences, technologies and social conventions—these cognitive processes are products of culture; fruits rather than seeds of cultural selection (Heyes, 2018b, 2020; Heyes, Chater & Dwyer, 2020).…”

Imitation and culture: what gives?

“…Do our capacities for imitation, theory of mind and other complex cognitive processes have nothing to do with our outstanding diversity (Culture 2 ) and propensity to improve socially learned behaviour over generations (Culture 3 )? That seems very unlikely, but an alternative solution to the puzzle is emerging: Recent research on the childhood development of imitation, theory of mind, and other complex cognitive processes suggests that -like beliefs, preferences, technologies and social conventions -these cognitive processes are products of culture; fruits rather than seeds of cultural selection (Heyes 2018b;Heyes, Chater & Dwyer, 2020).…”