“…For example, the European Investment Bank (eib), a body collectively owned by the Member States, was at various points activated during the crisis in order to help stimulate growth.51 Nationally-mobilized resources also provided the necessary start-up funding to the Single Resolution Fund (srf), a key component of the Single Resolution Mechanism (srm) within the European Banking Union. 52 The srf is being gradually built up based on contributions from financial institutions, but in the interim, participating Member States are providing the necessary bridge financing for bank resolution under the terms of an intergovernmental agreement,53 with the esm providing a further 'backstop' .54 Beyond these steps, the Member States (or at least those in the north) have demonstrated great reluctance to mobilize resources to complete the Banking Union, to the extent this would mean open-ended commitments to share fiscal resources with what they still perceive as their inadequately selfdisciplined neighbours to the south. This explains, for example, the continuing opposition, led by Germany, to the adoption of a jointly-funded 'European Deposit Insurance Scheme' (edis) as part of the Banking Union, despite pleas from the ecb.55 If Europe is unable to adopt an edis, despite the seemingly compelling case,56 it is difficult to imagine the Member States reaching an agreement over other reforms that would imply an even greater autonomous fiscal capacity at the supranational level (e.g.…”