Simulations of Denial of Service Attacks in Quantum Key Distribution Networks

Dervisevic, Emir; Lauterbach, Filip; Burdiak, Patrik; Rozhon, Jan; Slivova, Martina; Plakalovic, Matej; Hamza, Mirza; Fazio, Peppino; Vozňák, Miroslav; Mehić, Miralem

doi:10.1109/icat54566.2022.9811238

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The process assumes a perfect cloning device capable of cloning and maintaining all the characteristics and properties of that specific polarized photon, even though they are affected by the fidelity of the equipment used. Relative attacks such as beam-splitting [34][35][36] have been a platform for daisy chaining other exploratory exploitations, such as calibration attacks [37,38], side-channel attacks [39][40][41], which extend wavelength manipulation [42,43] with a similar profile attack, such as detector-deviceindependent [44], denial of service attack [45,46], intercept-resend attack [47], and Trojan horse attack [48].…”

Section: Quantum Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Key Distribution: Modeling and Simulation through BB84 Protocol Using Python3

Adu-Kyere

Nigussie

Isoaho

2022

Sensors

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Autonomous “Things” is becoming the future trend as the role, and responsibility of IoT keep diversifying. Its applicability and deployment need to re-stand technological advancement. The versatile security interaction between IoTs in human-to-machine and machine-to-machine must also endure mathematical and computational cryptographic attack intricacies. Quantum cryptography uses the laws of quantum mechanics to generate a secure key by manipulating light properties for secure end-to-end communication. We present a proof-of-principle via a communication architecture model and implementation to simulate these laws of nature. The model relies on the BB84 quantum key distribution(QKD) protocol with two scenarios, without and with the presence of an eavesdropper via the interception-resend attack model from a theoretical, methodological, and practical perspective. The proposed simulation initiates communication over a quantum channel for polarized photon transmission after a pre-agreed configuration over a Classic Channel with parameters. Simulation implementation results confirm that the presence of an eavesdropper is detectable during key generation due to Heisenberg’s uncertainty and no-cloning principles. An eavesdropper has a 0.5 probability of guessing transmission qubit and 0.25 for the polarization state. During simulation re-iterations, a base-mismatch process discarded about 50 percent of the total initial key bits with an Error threshold of 0.11 percent.

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Section: Quantum Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Key Distribution: Modeling and Simulation through BB84 Protocol Using Python3

Adu-Kyere

Nigussie

Isoaho

2022

Sensors

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“…Especially in cases when encryptors try to maintain a large number of IPsec sessions for which they initiate separate ETSI 004 sessions [6]. We analyzed such an approach in our previous work [13].…”

Section: Qkd End-user Standardsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following the previously discussed categorization of requests into priority queues [13], we calculated value of k as follows, and using the smallest possible characteristic p = 3, using 2 bits per element of Z 3 , which we use in the linear mixing (via Hadamard matrices).…”

Section: B Handling a Dos-danger By Key Store Exhaustion Attemptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intention is to support those legitimate applications that follow the instructions received from the KMS and do not make additional OPEN_CONNECT requests. • If KMS recognizes in the firewall query filtering algorithm [13] that the application generates new OPEN_CONNECT queries with the same KSID value (or new KSID value from the same IP address) and the previously reserved keys for that KSID session have not yet been served, then the KSID value is removed from the session list to sanction such aggressive behavior.…”

Section: B Handling a Dos-danger By Key Store Exhaustion Attemptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tackling Denial of Service Attacks on Key Management in Software-Defined Quantum Key Distribution Networks

et al. 2022

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A QKD network provides an additional security layer for IT-secure cryptographic key distribution that is added to existing conventional networks. Thus, QKD network components must be resilient to security challenges from conventional network environments. This paper provided solutions for realizing a Key Management System to avoid DoS attacks, and our solution allows applications to function securely in environments with a reduced amount of keys. In addition, we have provided approaches for allocating and managing QKD resources to avoid malicious key reservations. Simulation experiments verified the proposed solutions.

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