Simulation study on passive buildings’ demand incentive based on evolutionary game

Liu, Kai; Zhou, Hongmin; Kou, Yuanyuan; Zhang, Jiabao; Zhou, Xujuan; Zhang, Xiantang

doi:10.3233/jifs-179118

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…It focuses on the interaction among different players or groups to find the frequencies of strategies adopted in the population during the evolutionary game process as the evaluation criterion in making decisions [24]. Benefit from the above characteristics of evolutionary game, many scholars see it as an effective and practical analytical theory for analyzing the interactive mechanism between two players [10,18,[25][26][27]. Liu et al applied the evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamic evolution game law of government and consumers in passive buildings demand incentives [25].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Vehicle Infrastructure System or Autonomous Driving System? From the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Bai,

Wen,

Zhang

et al. 2024

Mathematics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we explore the trade-offs between public and private investment in autonomous driving technologies. Utilizing an evolutionary game model, we delve into the complex interaction mechanisms between governments and auto manufacturers, focusing on how strategic decisions impact overall outcomes. Specifically, we predict that governments may opt for strategies such as constructing and maintaining infrastructure for Roadside Infrastructure-based Vehicles (RIVs) or subsidizing high-level Autonomous Driving Vehicles (ADVs) without additional road infrastructure. Manufacturers’ choices involve deciding whether to invest in RIVs or ADVs, depending on governmental policies and market conditions. Our simulation results, based on scenarios derived from existing economic data and forecasts on technology development costs, suggest that government subsidy policies need to dynamically adjust in response to manufacturers’ shifting strategies and market behavior. This dynamic adjustment is crucial as it addresses the evolving economic environment and technological advancements, ensuring that subsidies effectively incentivize the desired outcomes in autonomous vehicle development. The findings of this paper could serve as valuable decision-making tools for governments and auto manufacturers, guiding investment strategies that align with the dynamic landscape of autonomous driving technology.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Vehicle Infrastructure System or Autonomous Driving System? From the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Bai,

Wen,

Zhang

et al. 2024

Mathematics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Specifically, in the process of pursuing maximum benefits, participants in evolutionary game can learn through observation, imitation, trial and error, and can continuously adjust their decisions to improve the effectiveness of the game. Based on this, more and more researchers tend to use evolutionary game theory to analyze and explain game phenomena in real life 23 , 24 .…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive strategy of safe and intelligent production in assembled steel plants from the perspective of evolutionary game

Wang

Chen

et al. 2023

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to the numerous cross-operations and poor information communication, it is easy to cause production safety accidents in traditional assembled steel plants. The transformation and upgrading of smart production in the assembly steel plants is helpful to improve the efficiency of safety management. In order to effectively reduce the safety risks in the production of assembled steel components, this paper integrates policy incentives and safety supervision, constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and assembled steel producers, and analyzes the strategic evolution rules and stability conditions of stakeholders through the replication dynamics equation. Moreover, based on the empirical simulation of the Fuzhou X Steel Structure Plant project, the effectiveness of the evolutionary model incentive strategy setting is verified. The results show that whether an assembled steel plants adopt a smart management strategy or not is influenced by the government's incentive subsidy mechanism, penalty mechanism, the benefits and costs generated by traditional/ smart management, the probability and loss of safety accidents and other factors. The conclusion is important for upgrading the safety management mode, improving the safety production efficiency and constructing the safety supervision system of the assembled steel smart plant.

show abstract

“…e governments and enterprises are limited rationality, have certain learning abilities and evolution, and behave independently [51][52][53][54][55].…”

Section: Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Low‐Carbon Policies Optimization for Smart Transportation Enterprises

Gao

Guo

Liu

et al. 2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As an important part of energy saving and carbon reduction, the low-carbon development of the transportation industry is imperative. It is the responsibility of smart transportation enterprises to closely combine their own digital technology with the governments’ policies to achieve green innovation. In this study, we conducted an evolutionary game model of the interaction between the governments and smart transportation enterprises, which depended on innovation subsidies and punitive taxes. Besides, we derived the evolutionarily stable strategy of the governments and enterprises and used a simulation to analyze the impact of various policy tools on green innovation strategy. The results showed that the behavior of the governments relies on the benefits of supervision and the costs of supporting green technology innovation. The enterprises’ behavior depends on the benefits of green innovation and the loss of no green innovation. Moreover, different policy tools provided by the governments can accelerate the implementation of enterprises’ green innovation.

show abstract

Simulation study on passive buildings’ demand incentive based on evolutionary game

Cited by 9 publications

References 13 publications

Cooperative Vehicle Infrastructure System or Autonomous Driving System? From the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Cooperative Vehicle Infrastructure System or Autonomous Driving System? From the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Incentive strategy of safe and intelligent production in assembled steel plants from the perspective of evolutionary game

Government Low‐Carbon Policies Optimization for Smart Transportation Enterprises

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About