Simple Tasks, Abstractions, and Semantic Dispositionalism

Abstract

According to certain kinds of semantic dispositionalism, what an agent means by her words is grounded by her dispositions to complete simple tasks. This sort of position is often thought to avoid the finitude problem raised by Kripke against simpler forms of dispositionalism. The traditional objection is that, since words possess indefinite (or infinite) extensions, and our dispositions to use words are only finite, those dispositions prove inadequate to serve as ground for what we mean by our words. I argue that, even if such positions (emphasizing simple tasks) avoid the traditional form of Kripke's charge, they still succumb to special cases of the finitude problem. Furthermore, I show how such positions can be augmented so as to avoid even these special cases. Doing so requires qualifying the dispositions of interest as those possessed by the abstracted version of an actual agent (in contrast to, say, an idealized version of the agent). In addition to avoiding the finitude problem in its various forms, the position that results provides new materials for appreciating the role that abstracting models can play for a dispositionalist theory of meaning.

Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster: Dispositions, Meaning, and Privilege

“…11 These are, of course, also the arguments on which the friends of dispositionalism focus when they have to defend the strategy. There is, therefore, something like a consensus that the destiny of dispositional analyses of meaning hinges on the status of these arguments (see, e.g., Båve 2020;Blackburn 1984;Cheng 2009 andGinsborg 2011;Heil & Martin 1998;Jones & Podlaskowski 2012;Kowalenko 2009;Kusch 2005;Podlaskowski 2012;and Schlosser 2011). This is unfortunate, since there are other arguments which provide, I think, stronger reasons to be wary of this approach.…”

Semantic dispositionalism without exceptions

“…Note, again, the relatively uncontroversial ideas involved in this solution of the problem of finitude. By contrast, others have tried to solve the problem by positing ''abstractions'' of agents (Podlaskowski (2012)), or dispositions that are ''infinitely projectible'' (Martin and Heil (1998: §4)) or ''composite'' (Warren (forthcoming)). Similar ideas have been proposed by Blackburn (1984), Tennant (1997: §4.13.2), and Shogenji (1993).…”

“…),Kusch (2005Kusch ( , 2006,Tennant (1997, §4.7),Miller (1997: 181ff. ),Pettit (1999),Pietroski and Rey (1995),Cheng (2009),Podlaskowski and Jones (2012) andPodlaskowski (2012).…”